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Causality is central to scientific inquiry. There is broad agreement on the
meaning of causal statements, such as “Smoking causes cancer”, or, “Applying
pesticides affects crop yields”. However, formalizing the intuition underlying such
statements and conducting rigorous inference is difficult in practice. Accordingly,
the overall goal of this dissertation is to reduce the difficulty of, and ambiguity
in, causal modeling and inference. In other words, the goal is to make it easy for
researchers to state precise causal assumptions, understand what they represent,
understand why they are necessary, and to yield precise causal conclusions with
minimal difficulty.
Using the framework of structural causal models, I introduce a causation coeffi-
cient as an analogue of the correlation coefficient, analyze its properties, and create
a taxonomy of correlation/causation relationships. Analyzing these relationships
provides insight into why correlation and causation are often conflated in practice,
as well as a principled argument as to why formal causal analysis is necessary. Next,
I introduce a theory of causal programming that unifies a large number of previ-
ously separate problems in causal modeling and inference. I describe the use and
implementation of a causal programming language as an embedded, domain-specific
language called ‘Whittemore’. Whittemore permits rigorously identifying and esti-
mating interventional queries without requiring the user to understand the details
of the underlying inference algorithms. Finally, I analyze the computational com-
plexity in determining the equilibrium distribution of cyclic causal models. I show
this is uncomputable in the general case, under mild assumptions about the distri-
butions of the model’s variables, suggesting that the structural causal model focus
on acyclic causal models is a ‘natural’ limitation. Further extensions of the concept
will have to give up either completeness or require the user to make additional —
likely parametric — model assumptions.
Together, this work supports the thesis that rigorous causal modeling and
inference can be effectively abstracted over, giving a researcher access to all of
the relevant details of causal modeling while encapsulating and automating the
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Causality is central to scientific inquiry. Unsurprisingly, there is an enormous
literature on the topic, with key contributions from philosophy [48], economics [34],
statistics [72], genetics [89], artificial intelligence [57], and other disciplines. There
is broad agreement on the meaning of statements such as, “Smoking causes can-
cer”, or, “Applying pesticides affects crop yields”, but the intuition underlying such
statements is often difficult to formalize.
Causality is implicit in ordinary language [8], which makes it easy to introduce
unwarranted assumptions, or fail to introduce necessary assumptions in analysis.
In practice, this leads to ambiguity in modeling and inference. Non-experimental
research is often presented as “indicative of” or “suggesting” causality. However,
1
outside of randomized, controlled experiments, it is not uncommon for researchers
to disagree on what “causality” even means. When faced with the difficulty of
rigorous causal modeling and inference, without the assumption of randomization,
many researchers choose to make no causal claims at all.
Accordingly, the overarching goal of this dissertation is to reduce the ambiguity
in, and difficulty of, causal modeling and inference; in other words, to make it easy
for researchers to state precise causal assumptions, understand what they represent,
understand why they are necessary, and to yield precise causal conclusions with
minimal difficulty. Although concerned with all aspects of causal inference, this
dissertation primarily focuses on predicting the effect of interventions from non-
experimental data (i.e. data not drawn from a randomized, controlled trial), which
is impossible without making additional assumptions. This dissertation aims to
make these assumptions easy to state and understand, while being amenable to
automated analysis.
What this goal entails may not be immediately clear; I claim that one of the
reasons that “causality” is ambiguous in practice is because it is used to refer to
several distinct, but closely related concepts. To clarify this point, I make frequent
reference to two conceptual hierarchies that are useful in guiding understanding and
analysis of causality: the Causal Hierarchy [74] and the Heckman Hierarchy [33].
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1.2 The Causal Hierarchy and Heckman Hierarchy
The Causal Hierarchy, also referred to as the “Ladder of Causation” (Figure
1.1), distinguishes between the types of queries that can be made in analysis:
1. Associational / statistical, e.g. “If we observe that this patient has a particular
symptom, will they recover?”
2. Interventional / causal, e.g. “If we treat this patient, will they recover?”
3. Counterfactual / hypothetical, e.g. “Given that this patient was treated, had
they not been treated, would they have recovered?”
The Causal Hierarchy is a hierarchy in the sense that these are successively
more general classes of queries. Associational queries are limited to observations
from a single model; observing a patient’s symptoms may provide information, but
does not affect any outcome. Interventions change the original model; prescribing
a treatment may cause the patient to recover, because it changes the factors that
determine the health of the patient. Counterfactual queries are the most general,
and can consider multiple possible worlds. The question of whether a patient who,
in fact, recovered would have recovered, had they not been treated involves inter-
vention (the original treatment), observation (the patient recovered), and another
hypothetical world (where the patient was not treated). These alternative “possible
worlds” or “potential outcomes” are commonly called counterfactuals because they
may — but are not required to — include conditions contrary to fact.
3
Figure 1.1: The Ladder of Causation [61], also called the Causal Hierarchy. Each
level represents successively more general questions, which require more sophisti-
cated modeling and inference to answer.
The Heckman Hierarchy (Table 1.1) distinguishes between the types of tasks
in causal inference:
1. Definition of the set of counterfactuals (potential outcomes)
2. Identification from population distributions
3. Selection given actual data
The Heckman Hierarchy is a hierarchy in the sense that each task depends on
the assumptions made in the previous task. The first task requires a scientific theory
4
Task Description Requirements
1 Defining the set of counterfactuals A scientific theory
2 Identifying parameters Mathematical analysis of
from population distributions point or set identification
3 Selecting models from actual data Estimation and testing theory
Table 1.1: The Heckman Hierarchy, adapted from [33]
to define the set of potential outcomes and provide rules for determining them. In
other words, potential outcomes are generated by a function of their determining
factors and manipulating these factors may generate different outcomes. For exam-
ple, classical mechanics permits modeling an object’s trajectory as a function of its
initial velocity. With respect to the assumptions in the model, it becomes possible
to predict alternative trajectories, had the initial conditions been different. Science
is based on constructing and testing such models, whether they are based on the
laws of physics, biological assumptions, or the expected utility hypothesis, to name
a few examples. It is only meaningful to treat something as a cause if it could have
— at least, in principle — been different and produced a different outcome.
With respect to the assumptions in a scientific theory, it becomes possible to
analyze problems of identification. For example, an elementary model of mechanics
may be parameterized by g, the acceleration imparted to objects due to Earth’s
gravity. The data gathered from any actual experiment to determine g will be sub-
ject to random errors. However, a well-designed experiment, combined with proper
analysis of the data will permit identifying g in the limit of infinite data samples.
In other words, identification requires finding unique mappings from population
measures to model parameters.
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Finally, model selection is the problem of inference in practice. This task lies
in the domain of estimation and hypothesis testing theory. It is the question of
what may be reasonably concluded from the actual data available, i.e. real world
samples subject to sampling variation. For example, depending on their particular
goal, a researcher may wish to accept or reject a particular hypothesis at some level
of confidence, or to calculate point or interval estimates of a parameter. Effective
model selection depends on the analysis of identification; a consistent estimator is
one that is guaranteed to converge to the true value in the limit.
The different levels of the Causal and Heckman Hierarchies are easily conflated
in practice. For example, propensity score matching is a method to estimate average
treatment effect from non-experimental data. The method works by approximating
estimands of the form
∑
s P (y | s, x)P (s) over a high dimensional S, by calculating∑
l P (y | l, x)P (l), over a one dimensional L [69] [57]. This is an estimator (task 3 in
the Heckman Hierarchy) for a statistical quantity (level 1 in the Causal Hierarchy).
With respect to certain model assumptions (task 1), this quantity is asymptotically
equal to the average treatment effect of X on Y (level 2). In this sense, propensity
score matching solves an identification problem (task 2).
Unfortunately, all of these conceptually separate concerns are considered part
of the same method, leading to ambiguity. When the necessary model assumptions
hold, propsensity score matching accurately estimates treatment effect; informally,
if the necessary assumptions hold, the resulting estimate is ‘as good as’ an estimate
obtained from experimental data. However, propensity score matching is generally
performed without explicitly specifying a causal model, making it difficult to judge
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if the model assumptions are reasonable for the problem at hand. In the best case,
this is an attempt to conduct inference with minimal assumptions. In the worst
case, it is ‘blind’ empiricism. Science is based on constructing and testing models
and a scientific theory of causality must do the same. Data analysis, alone, leads
nowhere without theory to guide it.
1.3 Research goal
In computer science, the essence of effective abstraction is to preserve all of the
relevant details in a given context, while hiding/encapsulating the irrelevant details.
Abstractions can be made at a mostly mathematical/conceptual level; for example,
models of computation, such as the Turing machine or lambda calculus, capture the
essential notion of computation, abstracting over details of computer architecture.
Abstractions also refer to concepts designed to be implemented in code; for example,
garbage collection hides the problem of memory management from a programmer
by automatically allocating and freeing memory.
The work in this dissertation builds on the existing theory of structural causal
models (SCMs). An SCM is a system of manipulable/modifiable equations that
generate the set of potential outcomes (counterfactuals). This can be seen as the
nonparametric generalization of the structural equation modeling (SEM) approach
that is dominant in econometrics [1], as well as providing semantics for the Neyman-
Rubin-Holland potential outcomes approach that is dominant in statistics and epi-
demiology [38]. SCMs are also closely related to probabilistic graphical models,
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specifically, Bayesian networks. Probabilistic graphical models are statistical mod-
els (level 1), but the causal diagrams associated with SCMs can be seen as the
causal generalization. In this dissertation, I consider structural causal models as a
foundational theory of causality and present work to support the following thesis:
Rigorous causal modeling and inference can be effectively abstracted over, giv-
ing a researcher access to all of the relevant details of modeling, while encapsulating
and automating the details of causal inference.
The following specific objectives guide this work:
• Justify and clarify the necessity of formal causal analysis. The maxim
“Correlation is not causation” has reached the status of statistical cliche. How-
ever, it is generally accepted that correlation is indicative of causation, without
being conclusive evidence of such. This suggests the following goal: determine
in what sense correlation and causation are related by devising a means by
which they can be directly compared. Specifically, design a taxonomy of corre-
lation/causation relationships and visualize how these relationships may occur
in practice.
• Develop a (meta-)theory of causal programming. Essentially, design
another axis of abstraction, similar in scope to the Causal Hierarchy and
Heckman Hierarchy, covering the types of problems in causal modeling and
inference. Specifically, develop a set of abstractions that permit capturing a
wide variety of problems of interest, unifying them into a single theoretical
framework. This theoretical framework should provide a means to separate
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the definition of a causal inference problem from the methods used to solve it,
unify existing methods, and remain open to future extension.
• Demonstrate the feasibility of causal programming. Specifically, im-
plement a causal programming language powerful enough to perform identifi-
cation and estimation of interventional queries. Such a language should permit
a researcher to declare causal models and queries with syntax similar to the
underlying mathematics, and automatically perform inference. In addition,
the implementation should support interactive ‘notebook’ usage to make it
easy to iteratively refine models while viewing results, as well as remaining
open to future extension.
• Understand the limitations of the theory. The focus of this dissertation
is limited to nonparametric, recursive (acyclic) causal models. A related goal
is to determine in what sense this is a natural limitation. Specifically, prove
that the equilibrium distribution of cyclic causal models is, in general, uncom-
putable. From this, I argue that any further generalization is ‘fundamentally’
difficult and will likely need to give up either completeness or nonparametric-
ity.
1.4 Overview
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 surveys the theoretical approaches to causality relevant to this
dissertation. This includes Neyman-Rubin-Holland potential outcomes, structural
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equation modeling, structural causal models, causal diagrams and graphical models,
and means of inference. The relationship between these different approaches and
their relationships to the Causal and Heckman hierarchies is analyzed. In addition
surveying different methods in causal modeling and inference, this chapter argues
that structural causal models serve as an appropriate foundation for a general theory
of causality.
Chapter 3 introduces a causation coefficient as analogue to the correlation
coefficient. A taxonomy of correlation/causation relationships is developed and
analyzed. This provides a principled argument for the necessity of formal causal
analysis — informal causal analysis will fail unpredictably.
Chapter 4 introduces the (meta-)theory of causal programming and its core
abstractions: model distribution, query, and formula, defined in terms of structural
causal models. A large number of existing problems can be encompassed in this
framework, and several existing algorithms can be viewed as solving special cases of
causal programming problems.
Chapter 5 introduces Whittemore, an implementation of causal programming
as an embedded, domain specific language. The syntax, semantics and relevant
implementation details are described for Whittemore’s approach to solving identi-
fication and estimation problems. Whittemore provides a declarative, interactive
approach to causal modeling and inference. It is declarative in the sense that the
user does not have to be aware of the implementation of the underlying inference
algorithms, and interactive in the sense that it can be used in a computational
‘notebook’ interface, providing immediate feedback to the user.
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Chapter 6 explores a fundamental limit to the theory: the equilibrium distri-
bution of cyclic, nonparametric models is proven to be uncomputable, given mild
assumptions about the distributions of the model’s variables. This demonstrates
that causal programming’s focus on recursive, nonparametric models is, in some
sense, a natural limitation and suggests that further generalizations will encounter
fundamental difficulties.
Finally, Chapter 7 concludes with a discussion of the contributions and limi-
tations of the work described in this dissertation, as well as opportunities for future
research.
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Chapter 2: Background: structural causal models
A map is not the territory it represents, but, if correct, it has a similar
structure to the territory, which accounts for its usefulness.
—Alfred Korzybski
2.1 Introduction
The original work in this dissertation builds on the theory of structural causal
models. This chapter provides an overview of previously existing theory and analyzes
the relationship between the Neyman-Rubin-Holland potential outcome, structural
equation modeling, and structural causal model approaches to causal inference. The
relationship between causal diagrams and Bayesian networks is also discussed. Since
the primary focus of this dissertation is on recursive (acyclic) models, substantive
discussion of cyclic models is deferred to Chapter 6.
The core concept of a structural causal model is deceptively simple: an SCM
is a manipulable/modifiable system of equations that generates a joint probability
distribution over the variables under consideration. Setting variables to particular
values (as opposed to observing or conditioning on particular values), generates
new outcomes, i.e. new joint probability distributions that model the effect of an
12
idealized external intervention.
This can be seen in a simple example.1 Consider the problem of a researcher
attempting to model the effect of applying fumigants to fields. The researcher
observes the level of fumigants applied by other farmers and their resulting crop
yields. However, the level of fumigants applied by each farmer depends on the
initial population of pests (e.g. a farmer is more inclined to apply fumigants if
they expect the population of pests to be higher that year), and both the initial
population of pests and the level of fumigants applied affect the final yield (i.e. the
observations were not from a randomized, controlled trial). These assumptions can
be captured in the following system of equations:
pests = f1(ε1)
fumigants = f2(pests, ε2)
yield = f3(pests, fumigants, ε3)
where each εi is an ‘error term’, accounting for factors outside of the model and
each fi is some function that determines each variable. One possible instantiation
of these assumptions is as a linear Gaussian model:
pests = ε1
fumigants = β1 pests + ε2
1This example is a simplified version of an agricultural example analyzed by Wainer [86] Pearl
[57].
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yield = β2 pests + β3 fumigants + ε3
where each εi is an independent, normally distributed (N(µi, σi)) random vari-
able, and each βi is a constant. This system of equations generates a joint proba-
bility distribution over pests, fumigants and yield, which is what the researcher
originally observes (the ‘observational distribution’).
With respect to this model, an idealized intervention can be represented by
replacing one or more of the generating equations. To model the action of applying
a particular level, x, of fumigants, the equation determining fumigants is replaced
by a constant, creating a new system of equations:
pests = ε1
fumigants = x
yield = β2 pests + β3 fumigants + ε3
which generates a new joint probability distribution representing the effect of
action (the ‘interventional distribution’).
Computing the interventional distribution acts as a prediction. In general —
assuming the model assumptions are correct — a researcher can predict a change to
a system, by calculating the probability distribution that arises from a corresponding
change to the model. The difficulty lies in making appropriate model assumptions.
As a rule, stronger model assumptions make inference easier, but weaker model
assumptions are more likely to correspond well to reality and be accepted by other
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researchers.
Linearity is a relatively strong assumption. An example of a weaker assump-
tion would be monotonicity, e.g. that an increase in the pest population always
results in a decrease in the crop yield. Weaker still is the assumption that yield is
a function of fumigants, pests and an independent error term, without committing
to any assumption of what that function is or how the error term is distributed. The
error term, or ‘background’ variable represents the factors that determine the final
yield, that are not explicitly accounted for in the model.2
It is this last class of model assumptions that is the main focus of this disser-
tation. The problem is to calculate the interventional distribution for every model
that is compatible with a given set of model assumptions. These model assumptions
can be compactly represented in graphical form: a vertex of a graph corresponds to




Figure 2.1: A causal diagram, representing the assumptions that yield is a function
of pests and fumigants, and fumigants is a function of pests. Each variable is
also (implicitly) assumed to be a function of an independent, arbitrarily distributed
‘background’ variable, representing factors outside of the model.
Structural causal models are certainly not the only approach to causal model-
ing and inference. However — in addition to acting as a survey of existing approaches
— this chapter argues that structural causal models are an appropriate foundation
2In reality, there may be many such factors, but since there are no restrictions on the distribution
of the error term, nor the determining function, all of these ‘background’ factors can be represented
by a single variable.
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for a general theory of causation. This argument is made with respect to a partic-
ular set of requirements for such a theory. These requirements do not apply to all
scenarios of interest, but are argued to be necessary in the general case — a less
powerful theory will be unable to express certain concepts of scientific interest.
2.2 Desiderata for causal modeling and inference
The first task in the Heckman Hierarchy is to define the set of counterfactuals
or potential outcomes. This is directly related to a core concept in causality: vari-
ables are functions of their determining factors and manipulating/changing these
factors generates new outcomes.
This is readily seen in a simple example. Consider Newton’s second law, re-
lating force, mass and acceleration, which elementary algebra permits being written








Common intuition suggests that if the force applied to some object were in-
creased, it would experience greater acceleration; the mass of the object would not
spontaneously increase to compensate. In other words, force causes acceleration, but
does not causally effect changes in mass. This is not clear from the standard presen-
16
tation of the equations, treating the equals sign as the equality relation, whereupon
all three equations are equivalent. Under this interpretation of the equals sign, the
equations specify a relationship that must be satisfied, but do not specify how the
system would respond to an external action.
The three equations are different if the equals sign is treated as an assignment
operator — this interpretation may be more familiar to programmers.3 In this
case, only the third equation captures the intuition that if force were increased,
then acceleration would increase proportionally, as long as no other changes to the
system were made. Likewise, if mass were increased, acceleration would decrease
proportionally. Assumptions of this kind are commonly referred to as ceteris paribus
assumptions, literally, “other things being equal”. In particular, ceteris paribus is a
mainstay of economic analysis [33].
This view of causality has its roots in neoclassical economics, especially in the
work of Mill [52] and Marshall [51] and was made more precise with Haavelmo’s
account of (linear) structural equation models [29]. Rubin and Holland [38] provide
a pithy motto that summarizes the main idea:
No causation without manipulation
This account of causality may not seem entirely satisfactory, depending on
how ‘manipulation’ is interpreted. For example, few would object to thinking of the
Sun’s gravity as a cause of Earth’s orbit, although, in practice, there are a number
of obstacles to significantly manipulating the Sun’s mass. This does not change the
3One might observe that the meaning would be clearer if a different symbol such as := or <- was
used to distinguish assignment from equality, but this convention has not been widely adopted.
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expectation that if the Sun’s mass were suddenly zero, then the Earth would not
continue to orbit, no matter how implausible actually implementing such a change
would be.
Implicit in such examples of causation is the idea that some effect (Y ), could
have been different if a cause (X) had been different, regardless of what was actually
observed. Such hypotheticals are usually referred to as ‘counterfactuals’. The idea of
defining causality in terms of counterfactuals originates with Hume, defining a cause
to be, “. . . where, if the first object had not been, the second never had existed” [40].
This idea was made more precise with Lewis’ account of counterfactuals, using the
possible world semantics of modal logic [48]:
If c and e are two distinct actual events such that e would not have
occurred without c, then c is a cause of e.
A classic example of a counterfactual sentence is, “If Nixon had pressed the
button, there would have been a nuclear holocaust” [21], which features a number
of important characteristics of counterfactuals in general. It cannot (nor should) be
empirically tested, but it is still related to the observable world — note that Nixon
did not ever order a nuclear strike, nor is the world a nuclear wasteland. The sen-
tence also, indirectly, implies empirical consequences. If the original counterfactual
sentence is true, anyone acting in a sufficiently similar scenario who does ‘press the
button’ should expect a nuclear holocaust.
The ideas of manipulations and counterfactuals are related. One view is that
a manipulation changes the original system or, more abstractly, generates a new
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model that represents the effects of the change. Alternatively, the complete set
of counterfactuals can be thought of as existing a priori and related to observable
variables by consistency constraints. Whether or not counterfactuals ‘actually’ exist
need not be a concern. Heckman summarizes the relevant metaphysical concerns
as, “A model is in the mind. As a consequence, causality is in the mind” [33].
Crucially, the notion of counterfactuals is distinct from that of uncertainty —
note that there is no notation in probability theory for “would have been”. At the
same time, statements of causality often include a probabilistic aspect. For example,
most would interpret, “If the grass is wet, then it rained”, as a statement that it is
likely that rain caused grass to be wet, without committing to a fully deterministic
model such as Newton’s second law does.
To summarize: A satisfactory approach to causal modeling and inference re-
quires the distinct concepts of manipulation, counterfactuals and uncertainty; treat-
ing any one of these as the same concept is a category error.
2.3 Potential outcomes
The potential outcome approach to causal inference, also known as the Rubin
causal model, or the Neyman-Rubin-Holland model, provides a notation suitable for
representing counterfactual statements. The statement that “Y would have taken
on value y, if X had been x, for unit u” is written as:
Yx(u) = y
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Units are primitives in the potential outcomes approach, which does not define
them further [38]. Examples of units include individual patients in a clinical setting,
or individual plots of land in an agricultural study. Variables (e.g. X, Y ) are real-
valued functions defined for every unit; for example, X is commonly defined to be
treatment and Y defined to be response to treatment in a clinical setting.
A particular quantity of interest is treatment effect4, which is defined as the
difference in response when a particular unit is exposed to treatment (X = t) versus
control (X = c):
Yt(u)− Yc(u)
Causal inference is difficult because, although there are many potential out-
comes for any particular variable, it is only possible to observe one actual outcome.
For example, it is impossible to treat and not treat the same patient.5 Holland
summarizes this as the Fundamental Problem of Causal Inference [38]:
It is impossible to observe the value of Yt(u) and Yc(u) on the same unit
and, therefore, it is impossible to observe the effect of t on u.
Causal inference is impossible without making additional assumptions — data
alone provides no knowledge of how observations will generalize to other circum-
stances. An example of a simple assumption that makes causal inference possible
4This quantity is sometimes referred to as ‘causal effect’; this dissertation adopts the conven-
tion of referring to this as ‘treatment effect’ to avoid confusion with the structural causal model
definition of causal effect.
5One might object that it is possible to not treat a patient initially, and then treat the same
patient later, but these are different units. The patient’s condition after waiting long enough to
observe the effects of non-treatment is different than their initial condition.
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is unit homogeneity, which can be thought of as ‘laboratory conditions’. If different
units are carefully prepared, it may be reasonable to assume that they are equivalent
in all relevant aspects, i.e. Yt(u1) = Yt(u2) and Yc(u1) = Yc(u2). For example, it is
often assumed that any two samples of a given chemical element are effectively iden-
tical. In these cases, treatment effect can be calculated directly as Yt(u1)− Yc(u2).
However, it is often the case that such tightly controlled conditions are impossible
to maintain. Accordingly, the main focus of the potential outcomes approach is on
average effects.
A probability distribution over the universe of units, P (u), induces a proba-
bility distribution over the potential outcome variables. Formally [57]:




Since the potential outcome variables are random variables, it is meaningful
to speak of average treatment effects. In particular, expected value (E) is a linear
operator which permits writing:
E(Yt − Yc) = E(Yt)− E(Yc)
In other words, it is possible to estimate average treatment effect by estimating
E(Yt) and E(Yc) individually. Unfortunately, it is not possible to sample from either
of these random variables directly. Yt is treatment over the entire universe of units, a
counterfactual world where every patient was exposed to treatment. Actual samples
would be from the random variable Y . Although these variables are different, they
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are still related to each other by the consistency axiom [23, 27]:
X(u) = x =⇒ Y (u) = Yx(u)
In other words, if the variable X is observed to take on value x, then the
potential response Yx is simply the current value of Y . An immediate consequence
of consistency is: P (Yx = y | X = x) = P (Y = y | X = x). Furthermore, if response
to treatment is independent of treatment (written as Yx ⊥⊥ X), then the following
equalities hold:
E(Y | X = t) = E(Yt)
E(Y | X = c) = E(Yc)
In this case, average treatment effect can be estimated directly from the col-
lected samples as E(Y | X = t) − E(Y | X = c). This expression is sometimes
referred to as the prima facie treatment effect [38].
However, there are many scenarios where selection of treatment is not inde-
pendent of response to treatment. Consider the question of whether smoking is a
cause of cancer. The prima facie effect may be significant. However, it is conceivable
that there exists a latent genetic factor that predisposes individuals to smoke, and
also makes them more susceptible to cancer.6 This is an example of the well-known
problem of confounding variables and the possibility of latent confounding variables
6Statistician Ronald Fisher is infamous for having spoke out against studies linking smoking
to cancer, while being ardent tobacco user himself. He later died of cancer. However, his actual
objections to the studies were not incorrect.
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is especially difficult to rule out.
The potential outcomes approach generally operates by making (conditional)
independence assumptions about potential outcome variables. Randomization, i.e.
the samples were obtained in a randomized controlled trial, makes the assumption7
Yx ⊥⊥ X especially plausible since — at least, theoretically — the selection of
treatment or non-treatment for each unit is determined entirely by an independent
source of randomness. In practice, there may be issues with imperfect compliance
(i.e. some patients may fail to take the drugs they are assigned), but randomized
controlled trials remain the ‘gold standard’ for causal evidence. [71]
Another common type of assumption that can permit causal inference is con-
ditional ignorability, (Yx ⊥⊥ X | Z), which is the statement that Yx and X are
conditionally independent given Z, a set of covariates that are being ‘adjusted’ or
‘controlled’ for. For example, if it were known that there was a genetic factor Z
(and no other such factors) that caused both smoking and cancer, then it would
be reasonable to assume conditional ignorability, which would permit the following
derivation [57]:
7This condition is referred as ‘no confounding’, ‘exogeneity’ or ‘ignorability’, depending on the
source [57, 69, 20].
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P (Yx = y) =
∑
z












P (y | x, z)P (z)
The notation belies a fundamental shift in perspective: the formula computes
the probability of a potential outcome, P (Yx), entirely in terms of observable prob-
abilities, P (y | x, z) and P (z), with respect to the assumption of conditional ignor-
ability.
This is, in essence, the potential outcomes approach to the second causal
inference task of identification. The first task, defining the set of counterfactu-
als, is implicitly performed by making conditional independence assumptions, e.g.
(Yx ⊥⊥ X | Z). The second task, identification, is performed via algebraic ma-
nipulations, using the axioms of probability theory and the axioms associated with
potential outcome variables. The third task is performed by calculating the ap-
propriate probabilities, brining in the machinery of estimation and/or hypothesis
testing theory as appropriate.
However, despite the power of the potential outcomes approach, an important
practical issue has not been addressed: how is a researcher to determine if the
conditional independence assumptions are true? The fundamental problem is deeper
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than this: potential outcomes notation, alone, does not even provide a way to
determine what it means for such a statement to be true! In the language of formal
logic, potential outcomes notation provides syntax but not semantics for causal
statements. Giving these statements meaning requires formalizing the notion of a
causal model.
2.4 Causal models
Consider a simple economic model of propensity to consume, assuming all
prices are constant. As an example, Haavelmo suggests a model where, “if the
group of all consumers in society were repeatedly furnished with the total income
or purchasing power x per year, they would, on the average or ‘normally,’ spend a
total amount y equal to” [29]:
y = βx+ α
where α and β are constants. It would be unreasonable to expect that, in
any particular year, spending would be exactly equal to y. This is not merely
a consequence of measurement errors — presumably there are a large number of
additional factors that could affect spending that are not directly accounted for in
this simple model. These additional factors can be indirectly represented by adding
a residual or ‘error term’ to the original equation:
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y = βx+ α + ε
= βx+ ε
where ε is a (usually, normally distributed) random variable; note that since
α is a constant and ε is a random variable, α + ε can be replaced by just ε. This is
a simple example of a structural equation model (SEM).
Haavelmo is notable for being the first researcher to explicitly interpret such
equations as predicting the result of idealized experiments. It may be the case that
an analyst is merely trying to fit the equation to the past and hopes that the relation
holds in the future, assuming no significant changes to the underlying system. A
stronger assumption is that consumers will continue to respond in the same way to
income, regardless of the sources from which their income originates. With respect
to this assumption, it is possible to predict the result of an intervention (e.g. gov-
ernment spending or taxation) to set income at a given level. Pearl formalizes this
interpretation of structural equations:
Definition 2.4.1 (Structural Equations [57]) An equation y = βx + ε is said
to be structural if it is to be interpreted as follows: In an ideal experiment where we
control X to x and any other set Z of variables (not containing X or Y ) to z, the
value y of Y is given by βx+ ε where ε is not a function of the settings x and z.
Note that this definition assumes an idealized intervention to set X to a par-
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ticular value, as opposed to conditioning on X; it is the difference between passively
observing a particular value (level 1 in the Causal Hierarchy) and taking action to
set the value (level 2 in the Causal Hierarchy). In practice, many manipulations that
are theoretically simple can turn out to be difficult or impossible implement. This
is not a strike against the definition, but a warning to carefully model interventions
as well as the causal relationships themselves.
The philosophical underpinnings of this definition are that of Laplacian (quasi-
) determinism. The residual, ε, represents all of the additional factors that determine
Y that are not directly modeled. In principle, if these factors were completely known,
it would be possible to exactly determine how Y would respond to any change. In
this view, randomness is a statement of an analyst’s ignorance, not inherent to the
system itself.
Structural equations are related to the potential outcomes approach, which
considers potential outcome variables to be real-valued functions of ‘units’. Since
units are primitives and not defined further, these functions are implicit. In struc-
tural equation modeling, these functions are explicit, where variables are functions
of all of their determining factors.
One of the weaknesses of structural equation modeling is that it makes very
strong assumptions — usually, linearity and the assumption that all variables are
multivariate normal. It is perhaps unsurprising then that many analysts are reluc-
tant to assign causal meaning to the equations and consider them to be merely a
‘shorthand’ way to represent a joint probability distribution. The linearity assump-
tion, in particular, is very restrictive — the earlier example of Newton’s second
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law violates it. Consider, also, the smoking/cancer example, where X is smoking,
Y is cancer, and Z is a possible genetic factor that predisposes one to smoke and
can cause cancer. These assumptions can be captured in the following system of
equations:
Example 2.4.1 (Smoking/cancer model)
Z = fZ(εZ)
X = fX(Z, εX)
Y = fY (X, Y, εY )
Each fi is some — possibly nonlinear – function. X, Y, Z are called ‘endogenous
variables’ since they are determined by factors in the model. εX , εY , εZ are called
‘background variables’ since they are determined by outside factors that are not
directly accounted for.8
There are many — in fact, an uncountably infinite number of — models that
are compatible with the smoking/cancer model assumptions. One instantiation of
the assumptions is as an SEM:
Example 2.4.2 (Linear smoking/cancer model)
Z = εZ
8These are sometimes referred to as ‘exogenous’ variables. Unfortunately, ‘exogeneity’ is often
used to refer to a number of subtly different conditions between sets of variables in a causal model.
To avoid confusion, the term ‘background variable’ will be used.
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X = Z + εX
Y = X + Y + εY
where each εi is an independently distributed normal random variable. Alter-
natively, Y could be modeled as a logistic function of X and Z:
Example 2.4.3 (Logistic smoking/cancer model)
Z = εZ




The key point is that SCMs are not limited to any particular set of func-
tional dependencies or distribution of background variables; SCMs are fully non-
parametric. This nonlinear generalization of structural equation models with arbi-
trarily distributed background variables originates with Pearl and Verma [62] and
has been referred to by several different terms including ‘probabilistic causal mod-
els’, ‘graphical causal models’ and ‘structural causal models’. The term ‘structural
causal models’ is used throughout this dissertation, since it appears least likely to
name clash with other terms in the literature.
Definition 2.4.2 (Structural Causal Model [3]) A structural causal model M
is a tuple M = 〈U, V, F, P (u)〉, where:
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1. A set U of background (also called exogenous) variables, that are determined
by factors outside the model
2. A set V = {V1, . . . Vn} of variables, called endogenous, that are determined by
variables in the model — that is, variables in U ∪ V ;
3. F is a set of functions {f1, . . . , fn} such that each fi is a mapping from (the
respective domains of) Ui ∪ PAi to Vi, where Ui ⊆ U and PAi ⊆ V \ Vi and
the entire set F forms a mapping from U to V ;
4. P (u) is a probability function defined over the domain of U .
Note that the definition of structural causal models requires that the set of
equations, F , form a mapping from U to V . In other words, that F has a unique
solution for V as a function of U . A sufficient condition for this is that the system
is recursive, i.e. there are no cyclic dependencies in the parent (PAi) sets of the
endogenous variables. A key difficulty with nonrecursive systems in structural causal
models is that they may require solving systems of nonlinear equations.
2.5 Interventions and the do() operator
Structural causal models provide a straightforward definition of interventions.
Consider an action to force some set of variables X to take on particular values x;
this is represented using the do() operator.
Definition 2.5.1 (Effect of action [57]) Let M be a structural causal model, X
a set of variables in V , and x a particular realization of X. The effect of action
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do(X = x) on M is given by the submodel Mx.
Definition 2.5.2 (Submodel [57]) Let M be a structural causal model, X a set
of variables in V , and x a particular realization of X. A submodel Mx of M is the
causal model:
Mx = 〈U, V, Fx, P (u)〉
where:
Fx = {fi : vi /∈ X} ∪ {X = x}
A submodel produced by do(X = x) can be thought of as the result of ‘wiping
out’ each fi that determines each Xi, and replacing fi with the constant xi, a process
which Pearl colorfully refers to as performing “surgery on equations” [57]. As an
example, consider an idealized intervention to determine the causal effect of smoking
on cancer. In the original model, M , the decision to smoke (X) is a function of a
background variable (εX) and a genetic factor (Z) that both predisposes one to
smoke and affects cancer risk. The intervention, do(X = x), effectively ‘cuts out’
the confounding from the genetic factor and produces a new model, Mx, in which
the factors that determine Z and Y are unchanged, but X has been set to the value
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x:
Example 2.5.1 (Smoking/cancer submodel)
Z = fZ(εZ)
X = x
Y = fY (X, Y, εY )
Given the definitions of a submodel and effect of action, the relationship be-
tween potential outcomes and structural causal models is remarkably straightfor-
ward:
Definition 2.5.3 (Potential Response [57]) Let X and Y be two subsets of vari-
ables in V . The potential response of y to action do(X = x), denoted Yx(u), is the
solution for Y of the set of equations Fx, that is, Yx(u) = YMx(u).
The probability of y, given the action do(X = x) is denoted9 by either P (Yx)
or P (y | do(x)), and is induced by the probability distribution over the background
variables, P (u), and the submodel, Mx:
P (Yx = y) = P (y | do(x)) =
∑
{u | YMx (u)=y}
P (u)
Note that P (y | do(x)) is also referred to as the causal effect of X on Y , when
viewed as a function from X to the space of probability distributions on Y [57].
9Other notations, such as Px(y) or P (y | x̂) are in use.
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This establishes the theoretical connection between potential outcomes and
structural causal models. It also highlights the philosophical differences between tra-
ditional structural equation modeling and potential outcome analysis. In structural
equation modeling, equations are usually assumed to be linear, with the random
variables being multivariate normal. In other words, structural equation modeling
relies on strong and explicit model assumptions. Potential outcome analysis is ef-
fectively the opposite: the model assumptions are weak and implicit. Independence
assumptions between potential outcome variables implicitly constrain the set of pos-
sible models under consideration, but do not provide much guidance on determining
what that set is.
Do notation also establishes the demarcation line between each level of the
Causal Hierarchy. Syntactically, an associational/statistical query is any query that
does not contain do() or any potential outcome variables; this is exactly what is ex-
pressible with the syntax of ordinary probability theory. Semantically, such a query
is concerned with a pre-intervention model. Syntactically, interventional/causal
queries may contain do(). Semantically, such queries are questions about post-
intervention models.
Finally, counterfactual queries are the most general and include the full range
of what is expressible in potential outcomes notation. For example, the effect of
treatment on the treated, e.g. the outcome (Y ) of treating a patient with X = x,
given thatX attains value x′ naturally, is expressible as P (Yx = y | x′), which is inex-
pressible in the do() notation. It is a question of probabilities in a post-intervention
model, but involves conditioning on variables in a pre-intervention model.
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Structural causal models permit analyzing general counterfactual queries: the
key insight that permits doing so is that although counterfactual questions consider
multiple counterfactual worlds simultaneously, the corresponding models share the
same background variables (εi) and functional dependencies (fi), thus, conditioning
on an event in the ‘actual’ world provides information about counterfactuals and
vice-versa. Since the primary focus of this dissertation is on interventional queries,
this section will not consider the analysis of counterfactual queries further.
2.6 Marschak’s maxim and causal diagrams
Heckman coined ‘Marschak’s Maxim’, in honor of an insight by Marschak [50]:
Forecasting policies may require only partial knowledge of the system.
From the definition, a complete specification of a structural causal model re-
quires specifying the functions that determine each endogenous variable and the
probability distribution over the background variables. The former is often difficult
to know; the later is often impossible, considering that the background variables are
usually the very factors that cannot be directly accounted for.
Marschak’s maxim is a reminder that a partial specification of a model may
still be sufficient to conduct causal inference. A set of independence assumptions
made in a potential outcomes analysis implicitly denotes a set of possible models.
Causal diagrams are another approach.
Every causal model induces a causal diagram, where each vertex in the di-
agram corresponds to an endogenous variable, Vi, and directed edges point from
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members of PAi to Vi. If the background variables are jointly independent and each
background variable appears in only one PAi set, the model is called Markovian [57].
Otherwise, the model is called semi-Markovian. Dependencies between endogenous
variables due to background variables are denoted by dashed, bidirectional edges.10
For example, if the genetic factor in the smoking/cancer example were known and
measurable, the model would be Markovian; otherwise, the model would be semi-
Markovian and X and Y would have a dashed, bidirectional edge between them to






Figure 2.2: Markovian (a) and semi-Markovian (b) causal diagrams. In (a), X,
Y , and Z are each functions of their parents and an independently distributed
background variable. In (b), X and Y share a background variable; equivalently, εX
and εY are not assumed to be independent.
There is a useful correspondence between causal diagrams and causal models.
Every causal model induces a causal diagram, and every causal diagram has at least
one model (in fact, infinitely many) that would induce it. A casual diagram can be
thought of as denoting a set of models where each endogenous variable is assumed to
be a function its parents, without committing to an assumption of what the function
is.
Causal diagrams are also closely related to probabilistic graphical models,
10An alternative convention is to enter observable variables as solid nodes and latent variables
as hollow nodes.
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specifically, Bayesian networks. The probably distribution P (v) induced by a Marko-
vian causal model respects the Markov condition.
Definition 2.6.1 (Markov condition [59]) If a probability function P admits the
factorization:
P (x1, . . . , xn) =
∏
i
P (xi | pai)
relative to DAG G, we say that G and P are Markov compatible.
Equivalently [4], variables are conditionally independent of their nondescen-
dants, given their parents. This is precisely the definition of (non-causal) Bayesian
networks. The crucial difference lies in the underlying assumptions. ‘Ordinary’
Bayesian networks are (level 1) associational/statistical models; they provide an ef-
ficient way to factor a joint probability distributions, but make no assumptions as
to how the distribution will change in response to an intervention. This can be seen
in a near-trivial example: consider the networks X → Y and Y → X; these have
identical factorizations under the Markov property, but different behavior under
intervention. In general, causal assumptions are necessary for causal conclusions.
This is concisely summarized in Cartwright’s maxim [10]:
No causes in, no causes out.
Inference in the structural causal model approach is generally performed with
respect to the assumptions entailed by a causal diagram. For example, calculating
the causal effect of X on Y in the smoking/cancer model is a simple adjustment for
direct causes.
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Theorem 2.6.2 (Adjustment for Direct Causes [57]) Let PAi denote the set
of direct causes of variable Xi and let Y be any set of variables disjoint of {Xi∪PAi}.
The effect of the intervention do(Xi = xi) on Y is given by:
P (Y | do(xi)) =
∑
pai
P (y | xi, pai)P (pai)
Applying this theorem to the smoking/cancer example (Figure 2.2 (a)) yields:
P (y | do(x)) =
∑
z
P (y | x, z)P (z)
Formally, it is said that the causal diagram and the probabilities P (y | x, z)
and P (z) identify P (y | do(x)). Note that if Z is latent, then P (y | do(x)) is not
identifiable. Intuitively, there is no way of knowing if correlation between X and Y
is due to the latent factor, or due to the effect of X on Y .
Unsurprisingly, this is the same result as from the potential outcomes analysis.
In the potential outcomes approach, the set of causal models under consideration is
implicitly specified by the conditional independence assumptions between potential
outcome variables. Causal diagrams more explicitly denote the set of models under
consideration, and consider properties like conditional independences to be a conse-
quence of the model assumptions entailed in the diagram. In both cases, Marschak’s
maxim is in play. A complete specification of the model is not needed to calculate
the causal effect; the formula correctly calculates P (y | do(x)) for all models under
consideration.
Note that incorrectly adjusting for variables can produce biased estimates
37
of causal effect. Consider a model where the treatment affects recovery, but the
treatment also affects blood pressure, which, in turn, affects recovery (Figure 2.3).
An adjustment for direct causes, i.e.
∑
blood-pressure
P (recovery | treatment, blood-pressure)P (blood-pressure)
should not be performed in this case, since blood-pressure is not a direct cause
of treatment. Intuitively, adjusting for blood pressure would ‘block’ the causal effect




Figure 2.3: A causal diagram where effect of treatment on recovery is mediated by
blood pressure. Estimating the treatment effect by adjusting for blood-pressure is
incorrect in this case.
2.7 Philosophical foundations
The philosophical underpinnings of structural causal models depend on a few
well-accepted principles: counterfactuals as the basis for a theory of causality, models
as the basis for a semantic theory of truth, and probability theory as the basis for
a theory of uncertainty. It is a futile exercise to argue that these principles are
somehow a priori correct; the practical question is to what degree these principles
are useful, generally accepted, and compatible with human intuition.
Probability theory’s pedigree is impeccable: in addition to Kolmogorv’s ax-
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iomatization, Cox’s theorem [84] provides a formal argument for probability theory
as the basis of analyzing uncertainty, and de Finetti’s Dutch Book argument requires
that wagers/prices obey the axioms of probability theory in order to be coherent
[17]. Empirically, probability theory has been an enormous success: it is effectively
the basis of all of statistics and machine learning. It may be the case that, for
specific scenarios, a researcher wishes to consider problems of causality without in-
troducing the notion of uncertainty. However, any general theory of causality needs
to formally consider uncertainty to be taken seriously.
The semantic theory of truth, i.e. the idea that models provide meaning
for sentences, is similarly well accepted in modern mathematics, philosophy and
computer science. The truth of a sentence in a formal language is judged relative
to a formal model that provides an interpretation of said sentence. This is the core
principle behind model theory in mathematics and formal methods in computer
science, and it would seem profoundly strange to not respect it in the domain of
causal analysis. It has been suggested that this is the main reason that the potential
outcomes approach has not been widely adopted outside of statistics [57] — it is
too difficult for most would-be users to judge if model assumptions are reasonable
without referring to actual examples of models. A rough analogy can be made with
Hoare logic, which provides axioms and inference rules to prove the correctness of
computer programs. Attempting causal inference without explicit models is like
trying to prove the correctness of programs while being unable to explicitly write
down a program.11
11Anecdotally, Elias Bareinboim reports being unable to find a single statistician capable of spec-
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The principle that a theory of causality falls out of a theory of counterfactuals
as a by-product lacks the essentially universal acceptance of probability theory and
model theory. In fact, some statisticians explicitly argue against counterfactuals
[16], citing them as untestable or metaphysical. However, counterfactual thinking
matches the intuitive way that human beings think of causality: for an event to be
a cause of another, it must have been possible, in principle, for the cause to have
been different. Mere untestability should not be grounds to disqualify questions
from analysis; science routinely considers questions that have no obvious means of
empirical validation, and tries to fit explanations to systems that cannot be directly
controlled. Notably, the idea that different possible outcomes are generated by ma-
nipulating the factors that determine them is essentially universally accepted in
economic analysis. Arguably, economics is the science most concerned with predict-
ing the effects of interventions, despite a general lack of ability to conduct controlled
experiments.
Given these principles, structural causal models are not merely one possible ap-
proach to causal modeling and inference; they are a foundation for a general theory
of causality. As an analogy, consider the lambda calculus as a foundational theory
of computation. The lambda calculus captures the essential notion of computation.
There are numerous extensions, e.g. type theory, and it remains unclear what it
means to prove that the Church-thesis is correct, but it provides (one possible)
foundation for a general theory of computation. In particular, the lambda calcu-
lus subsumed the existing notions of computability as special cases. Analogously,
ifying an example model where (Yz ⊥⊥ Zx | Z,X) and (Yz 6⊥⊥ Zx | Z) (personal communication).
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structural causal models unify and extend the potential outcomes and structural
equation modeling approaches.
These philosophical principles leave the actual problem of inference with struc-
tural causal models unaddressed. When a structural causal model is fully specified,
there is very little inference left to be done: calculating the effect of an intervention
can be done in a straightforward manner from definition of the do() operator. In
practice, fully specifying a structural causal model is generally impractical for prob-
lems of interest; modeling a real system involves considering possible equivalence
classes of models, since the full details remain unknown.
The core problem is to determine what kinds of equivalence classes of models
should be considered. The previous section introduces causal diagrams, which are
the main object of study in the rest of this dissertation. Compared to structural
causal models themselves, there are not strong philosophical principles to justify
causal diagrams as the canonical model representation.
One argument is that the assumptions entailed by a causal diagram are com-
pletely nonparametric — there are no model assumptions, other than that each
variable is a function of its parents. In this sense, the assumptions embodied in a
causal diagram are minimal, while remaining compatible with the requirement that
models be explicit — it is straightforward to fully specify an example compatible
structural causal model, given a diagram. However, it is not uncommon to use ad-
ditional semi-parametric assumptions in analysis. For example, the monotonicity
of a function in a model may permit identification, while completely nonparametric
assumptions do not [34]. Conversely, a researcher may wish to base their analysis
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on weaker assumptions, e.g. to enter the fact that either X causes Y or Y causes
X, without knowing which.
Ultimately, this dissertation focuses on causal diagrams as a matter of practi-
cality: the existence of a concise set of powerful inference rules for causal diagrams
makes inference particularly amenable to automated inference.
2.8 Inference with structural causal models
The best-studied set of inference rules for structural causal models are known
as the “causal calculus” or “do-calculus”, described by Pearl [56]. Along with the
axioms of probability theory, these rules form the theoretical foundation for much
of the analysis in the rest of this dissertation:
Theorem 2.8.1 (Causal calculus [56])
P (y | x̂, z, w) = P (y | x̂, w) if (Y ⊥⊥ Z | X,W )GX (Rule 1)
P (y | x̂, ẑ, w) = P (y | x̂, z, w) if (Y ⊥⊥ Z | X,W )GXZ (Rule 2)
P (y | x̂, z, w) = P (y | x̂, w) if (Y ⊥⊥ Z | X,W )G
X,Z(W )
(Rule 3)
Note that x̂ is used as an abbreviation for do(x) in this dissertation, whenever
the density of equations threatens to render the do notation unreadable.
In the causal calculus inference rules, W , X, Y , and Z are arbitrary disjoint
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sets of nodes in a causal DAG G. GX denotes the graph obtained by deleting from
G all arrows pointing into nodes in X. GX denotes the graph resulting from deleting
all arrows emanating from G. Z(W ) is the set of Z-nodes that are not ancestors of
any W -node. (Y ⊥⊥ Z|X,W )G denotes the conditional independence of Y and Z
given X and W in all models compatible with G.
Causal diagrams are particularly useful as equivalence classes of models be-
cause they permit determining conditional independences between (sets of) variables
via a simple criteria known as d-separation [26]:
Theorem 2.8.2 (d-seperation) A path p is said to be d-separated by a set of nodes
Z if and only if
• p contains a chain i→ m→ j or a fork i← m→ j such that the middle node
m is in Z, or
• p contains an inverted fork (collider) i→ m← j such that the middle node m
is not in Z and such that no descendants of m is in Z.
A set Z is said to d-separate X from Y if and only if Z blocks every path from
a node in X to a node in Y.
Theorem 2.8.3 (Probabilistic implications of d-separation) If sets X and Y
are d-separated by Z in a DAG G, then X is independent of Y conditioned on Z in
every distribution compatible with G. Conversely, if X and Y are not d-separated
by Z in a DAG g, then X and Y are dependent conditional on Z in at least one
distribution compatible with G.
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The converse is even stronger — the absence of d-separation implies depen-
dence in almost all distributions compatible with G [57].
X YZ
Figure 2.4: A semi-Markovian causal diagram that permits identification of P (y |
do(x)); the causal effect can be determined in terms of the observational probabil-
ity distribution by repeatedly applying rules of probability theory and the causal
calculus.
Causal inference can be performed by repeatedly applying these rules, in con-
junction with the rules of probability theory. For example [57], P (y | x̂) can be
identified for all models entailed by the assumptions in figure 2.4, in terms of the
observational probability distribution as follows:
P (y | x̂) =
∑
z














P (y | x, ẑ)P (x | ẑ)
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P (y | x, ẑ)P (x)
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P (y | x, z)P (x)
]






P (y | x, z)P (x)
]
P (z | x) (rule 2)
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The difficulty of applying these inference rules has prompted the development
of algorithms based on the causal calculus (discussed in Chapter 4). For certain
classes of problems, these algorithms automatically perform causal inference, and
have completeness guarantees — if they fail to yield an answer, it is because it is
impossible to calculate the given causal effect for every model entailed by the given
causal diagram. These algorithms can be thought of as an abstraction over the rules
of the causal calculus and probability theory; the algorithms are proven correct with
respect to these rules, but a researcher using the algorithms does not have to have
detailed knowledge of the rules to perform inference.
One of the main goals of this dissertation is to develop higher-order abstrac-
tions, making it possible to perform rigorous causal inference without having to
be aware of the underlying algorithms. In other words, the goal is to make causal
inference fully declarative; a researcher should be able to enumerate what they al-
ready know and what they wish to determine, with the actual inference performed
automatically.
It may not be immediately clear that the formalism of structural causal models
is even necessary in practice. Although it is generally understood that correlation
does not imply causation, it appears to act as useful guide in practice. A high degree
of correlation ‘suggests’ causality, with experimental evidence providing confirma-
tion. Why this may often appear to be the case, and an argument as to why it is
insufficient, is the topic of the next chapter.
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Chapter 3: A taxonomy of correlation/causation relationships
Correlation6=causation: the first thing taught in causal inference classes,
and the last thing learned.
—Gwern Branwen
3.1 Introduction
The maxim “Correlation is not causation” has reached the status of statistical
clich. The difference is readily apparent if the Causal Hierarchy is taken seriously:
correlation is an associational/statistical measure, i.e. a first-level query of the hier-
archy. Interventional/causal queries are second level. This emphasis on firewalling
the statistical from the causal leads directly to a new mystery: why do the two
remain so easily confused in practice?
Other maxims have been proposed, such as, “Correlation is not causation, but
it sure is a hint.” or “Correlation is necessary but not sufficient for causation.” [82].
The former is true, but underspecified. The latter is true in one sense, and demon-
strably false in another. To help clarify these questions, this chapter introduces a
causation coefficient, γ, to compare correlation and causation directly, a taxonomy
to classify all of the possible relationships, and ργ plots to visualize sets of causal
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models.
Both the proposed taxonomy and ργ plots are based on the causation coef-
ficient. The correlation/causation taxonomy outlines the different ways in which
correlation may (fail to) coincide with causation, with the goal of making it easier
for researchers to recognize these effects in practice. In addition, example models
of three variables are included with each classification in the taxonomy, rendering
the taxonomy a constructive proof that the existence, or lack thereof, of correlation
provides no guarantees about causation.
The ργ plots are accompanied with an analysis of how correlation and cau-
sation relate in the ‘average’ model; this recovers some of the intuition as to why
correlation ‘suggests’ causation and an explanation why they are so easily confused
in practice.
3.2 The causation coefficient
The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient, ρ, is a standard measure
of correlation between random variables. This is commonly described as a measure
of how well the relationship between X and Y can be modeled by a linear relation-
ship with ρ = −1/ + 1 being a perfect negative/positive linear relationship and 0
representing no linear relationship at all. The population correlation coefficient is




V ar[X]V ar[Y ]
=
E[XY ]− E[X]E[Y ]√
(E[X2]− E[X]2)(E[Y 2]− E[Y ]2)
For discrete random variables, this is a function of the joint probability mass
function (for continuous random variables that admit a probability density function,













2P (x)− (∑x xP (x))2)(∑y y2P (y)− (∑y yP (y))2)
The causation coefficient relies on the observation that the correlation coeffi-
cient can, by the law of total probability, be rewritten as a function of the conditional


















2P (y | x)P (x)− (∑x∑y yP (y | x)P (x))2)
Syntactically, the causation coefficient, γX→Y , is defined by replacing P (y | x)
with P (y | x̂) and P (x) with P̂ (x); note that P (y | x̂) is simply an alterna-
tive notation for the causal effect, P (y | do(x)). P̂ (x) is the distribution of in-
terventions, described below. As a convenience, the following terms are also de-
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fined: V ar[X̂] =
∑
x x
















y yP (y | x̂)P̂ (x)√
V ar[X̂]V ar[YX̂ ]
Like the correlation coefficient, the causation coefficient assumes values in the
range [−1, 1]; intuitively, the causation coefficient can be thought of as what the cor-
relation coefficient would have been, had the data been drawn from a randomized
controlled trial. The distribution of interventions is, literally, a probability distribu-
tion over the independent variable, X. In the discrete case, it can be thought of as
a set of weights for averaging the possible causal effects. It may be distinct from the
marginal observational distribution of X, P (x), since the relative sizes of cohorts in
an observational study may be different than the relative sizes of different treatment
(and control) groups in an randomized controlled trial.
As an example, consider a scenario where patients decide for themselves whether
or not to take some treatment (X), and observe whether or not they recover (Y ).
This can be modeled with Bernoulli (binary) random variables for X and Y , with
0 representing no treatment / failure to recover and 1 representing treatment / re-
covery. The probability of patients deciding for themselves whether or not to take
the drug, in this observational study, is the marginal probability P (x). In clinical
terms, P (X = 0) and P (X = 1) are the relative sizes of the cohorts.
However, even in an idealized observational study, P (y | x) would not provide
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definitive information on whether treatment actually improves patient outcomes.
For example, a drug could cause unpleasant side effects in the patients that would
have received the greatest benefit, leading those patients to choose not to take the
drug. An idealized randomized controlled trial would permit an analyst to directly
measure P (y | x̂), as randomization explicitly cuts out confounding.
The relative sizes of the cohorts in an observational study may be different than
the relative sizes of the treatment and control groups in a corresponding randomized
controlled trial — this is the use of the distribution of interventions P̂ . Experiments
are often designed to have equal group sizes as this typically provides maximum
statistical power, but this is by no means universal. Also, it is not uncommon for
patients to drop out or otherwise be disqualified from studies, so the cohorts will
often be unequal in practice.
The natural causation coefficient, denoted γX→Y or γ, is defined for P̂ (x)
equal to the pre-intervention marginal distribution, P (x). This corresponds to an
experimental trial where the treatment groups are scaled to be proportional to the
relative sizes seen in the observational study.
The maximum entropy causation coefficient, denoted γH,X→Y or γH , is the
causation coefficient where P̂ (x) is a maximum entropy probability distribution.
For random variables with bounded support, this is the uniform distribution and
corresponds to equal treatment group sizes.
Other distributions of interventions are possible, to reweigh the effects of cer-
tain interventions relative to others in the computation of the causation coefficient.
These should be denoted explicitly as γP̂ . For example, a certain drug may be known
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to be helpful in certain small doses, but worse than no treatment at all in larger
doses, in which case both the natural and maximum entropy coefficients could be
misleading. In such cases, a distribution of interventions corresponding to current
best practices may be more informative.
3.3 Some properties of the causation coefficient
The causation coefficient is closely related to the average treatment effect and
invariance, the causal equivalent of independence. This makes the causation coef-
ficient particularly useful for building a taxonomy of possible correlation/causation
relationships later in this chapter.
Definition 3.3.1 (Average treatment effect [12]) The average treatment effect
is the average difference between the outcomes when a patient is treated and when a
patient is not treated. For Bernoulli random variables, this is:
ATE(X → Y ) = P (Y = 1 | do(X = 1))− P (Y = 1 | do(X = 0))
This is the probabilistic causal model equivalent of the Rubin-Neyman-Holland
definition of average treatment effect [37]. Positive ATE implies that treatment is,
on average, superior to non-treatment, while negative ATE implies the opposite.
Theorem 3.3.2 For Bernoulli distributed X and Y , γX→Y is equal to:
51
γX→Y = ATE(X → Y )
√
V ar[X̂]
V arX̂ [Y ]
Proof. Consider the numerator of γ. For Bernoulli random variables:
P (y | do(x = 1))P̂ (x = 1)− P̂ (x = 1)(P (y = 1 | do(x = 1))P̂ (x = 1)
+ P (y = 1 | do(x = 0))P̂ (x = 0))
= P̂ (x = 1)(P (y = 1 | do(x = 1))− P̂ (x = 1)P (y = 1 | do(x = 1))
− P̂ (x = 0)P (y = 1 | do(x = 0)))
= P̂ (x = 1)(P (y = 1 | do(x = 1))− P̂ (x = 1)P (y = 1 | do(x = 1))
− (1− P̂ (x = 1))P (y = 1 | do(x = 0)))
= P̂ (x = 1)(P (y = 1 | do(x = 1))− P (y = 1 | do(x = 0))
− P̂ (x = 1)(P (y = 1 | do(x = 1))− P (y = 1 | do(x = 0))))
=(P (y = 1 | do(x = 1))− P (y = 1 | do(x = 0)))P̂ (x = 1)(1− P̂ (x = 1))
=ATE(X → Y )V ar[X̂]
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Therefore, γX→Y = ATE(X → Y )(V ar[X̂]/V arX̂ [Y ])1/2. 
Since variance is strictly positive for nondegenerate Bernoulli distributions,
this implies that γ has the same sign as the average treatment effect. In other
words, positive γ is equivalent to treatment causing, on average, a better outcome
than non-treatment, with the opposite being the case for negative γ.
The definition of the independence of random variablesX and Y is: ∀x, y P (x, y) =
P (x)P (y) or, equivalently: ∀x, y P (y | x) = P (y). In other words, observing X pro-
vides no information about Y (and vise-versa). The causal equivalent is invariance
of Y to X: ∀x, y P (y | x̂) = P (y); that is to say, no possible intervention on X can
affect Y [4]. Unlike independence, invariance is not symmetric. This dissertation
suggests the term mutually invariant for when both Y is invariant to X and X is
invariant to Y .
For Bernoulli random variables, X and Y are uncorrelated (ρ = 0) if and only
if they are independent. The analogous condition holds for the causation coefficient.
For Bernoulli distributed X and Y , γX→Y = 0 if and only if Y is invariant to X.
Theorem 3.3.3 For Bernoulli X, Y , γX→Y = 0 if and only if Y is invariant to X.
Proof. Consider the definition of average treatment effect, ATE(X → Y ) =
P (y = 1 | do(x = 1)) − P (y = 1 | do(x = 0)). Average treatment effect is zero if
and only if P (y = 1 | do(x = 1)) = P (y = 1 | do(x = 0)). Since the support of
a Bernoulli random variable is {0, 1}, both probabilities must be 0.5; therefore, Y
invariant to X. Since γ has the same sign as the average treatment effect, γX→Y = 0
if and only if Y is invariant to X. 
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Note that both the correlation and causation coefficients have difficulty cap-
turing nonlinear relationships between variables. In general, independence implies
ρ = 0 and invariance implies γ = 0, but the converse does not hold for many
distributions.
As a simple example, Table 3.1 contains interventional distributions where Y
is not invariant to X, but the maximum entropy causation coefficient γH = 0. The
natural causation coefficient may be positive, negative or zero depending on the
observational (pre-intervention) distribution P (x).




Table 3.1: Non-invariant interventional distributions where γH = 0
3.4 Example: treatment of kidney stones
As noted in the Background chapter, randomization of an independent variable
effectively ‘cuts’ all incoming edges to that node in a causal diagram, removing
potential confounding variables. In the context of a randomized controlled trial, the
correlation coefficient and causation coefficient coincide; an estimate of one is an
estimate of the other.
When the available data is not from a randomized controlled trial, an estimate
of the causation coefficient can be thought of as an estimate of what the correlation
coefficient would be in a randomized controlled trial. As an example, Table 3.2 is a
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summary of data from a non-experimental study on the treatment of kidney stones
[11]. The subgroups (Z) refer to kidney stone size. The study can be modeled
with binary treatment (X) and response (Y ) variables, with the decision to perform
percutaneous nephrolithotomy (PCNL) as X = 0 and surgery as X = 1; similarly,
failure to recover and recovery are modeled as Y = 0 and Y = 1, respectively.
Small Large Overall
Open surgery 81/87 (0.93) 192/263 (0.73) 273/350 (0.78)
PCNL 234/270 (0.87) 55/80 (0.69) 289/350 (0.83)
Overall 315/357 (0.88) 247/343 (0.72) 562/700 (0.80)
Table 3.2: Success rate of treatment for kidney stones; successful/total (probability)
The naive model is that kidney stone size does not affect treatment or recovery;
this assumption corresponds to the causal diagram in Figure 3.1(a). In such a case,
the natural causation coefficient equals the population correlation coefficient; with
this dataset, the estimate of these coefficients would be ≈ −0.057. This is also
the case for Figure 3.1(b), where Z partially mediates the treatment’s effect on
recovery. Adjusting for Z would be incorrect; intuitively, this would ‘block’ Z’s










Figure 3.1: Some of the possible causal diagrams for modeling kidney stone treat-
ment. In (a), Z does not affect treatment or response. In (b) Z (partially) mediates
the treatments effect on recovery. In (c), Z causally effects treatment and recovery,
and an adjustment for direct causes should be performed.
In reality, the size of kidney stones (Z) affected which treatment was per-
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formed; that is to say, Figure 3.1(c) is the correct causal diagram. Correctly esti-
mating P (y | do(x)) requires an adjustment for direct causes (Theorem 2.6.2), i.e.
P (y | do(x)) = ∑z P (y | x, z)P (z). For this dataset, the estimate of the causation
coefficient is ≈ 0.068. Since the cohorts are equal in size, the natural causation
coefficient and maximum entropy causation coefficient are identical.
Note that this is the opposite sign as the correlation coefficient (equal to the
causation coefficient in the ‘naive’ model). Since the causation coefficient has the
same sign as the average causal effect, this suggests that open surgery (X = 1) is
the superior treatment.
This ‘reversal’ effect caused by conditioning on a subgroup is well-known as
Simpson’s paradox and requires causal information to resolve correctly [58]. There
is a subtlety worth addressing: Simpson’s paradox refers the phenomena where the
association between a pair of variables (X, Y ) reverses sign upon conditioning on
a third variable, Z, regardless of the value of Z. However, the existence of such a
variable does not imply that it should be conditioned on. This is closely related to
the problems of ‘p-hacking’ in the scientific literature, in which researchers selectively
analyze or collect data until a publishable result is found, which is a misreporting
of the true effect sizes [32].
3.5 Taxonomy of correlation/causation relationships
For Bernoulli random variables, it is possible to exhaustively characterize the
possible relationships betweenX and Y , given the sign of ρ and γ. These have impor-
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tant interpretations: positive ρ is positive correlation, i.e. X and Y have a positive
relationship in observational studies, and positive γ is positive causation, which has
the interpretation that treatment, on average, is superior to non-treatment.
The causation coefficient provides a unified way to consider all of the possible
relationships at once. ρ and γ can each be positive, negative or zero which implies 9
possible relationships. These are grouped under 5 categories in the following table.
ρ γ
invariant and independent 0 0
common causation +/- 0
inverse causation +/- -/+
unfaithful 0 +/-
genuine causation +/- +/-
Table 3.3: Correlation/causation relationship by sign of coefficients
In this table, “+/-” refers the coefficient taking on a positive or a negative
value, e.g. inverse causation refers to a model producing positive ρ and negative γ
or negative ρ and positive γ. Many of the relationships described in the following
section are well-known and existing names are used whenever appropriate, along
with examples from existing studies. In addition, for each possible relationship, a
simple causal model including 3 Bernoulli distributed variables (treatment X, re-
sponse Y and confounder Z) that produce the described relationship to demonstrate
that all of these outcomes are possible, even for the simplest confounded models.
All of the following models are compatible with the causal diagram in Figure 3.1(c).
Note that the taxonomy is based on population coefficients, i.e. the relation-
ships that will persist, even in the limit of infinite data samples. Other corre-
lation/causation relationships that lie outside this taxonomy are discussed at the
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summary at the end of this chapter.
3.5.1 Invariant and independent
Two variables that are invariant and independent are completely unrelated —
neither observing nor manipulating one can provide information about or change
the other. Invariance and independence is usually the default assumption when
studying a system; in hypothesis testing, the null hypothesis is “no effect”. The
notion of light cone provides an example familiar to physicists - the principle of
locality and the theory of special relativity imply that no object outside of our light
cone can ever affect us.
Invariant and independent variables can be trivially mathematically modeled.
I introduce such an example to demonstrate how I will model the other possible
relationships between correlation and causation. Let εX , εY , εZ be fair coins.
1 These
are the model’s background variables, i.e. the random factors outside of the model
that determine the variables within the model.
X will generally model a cause or treatment and Y an effect or response. An
example model with invariant and independent X and Y is simply:
Z = εZ
X = εX
1A ‘fair coin’ is commonly used in probability and statistics to refer to independent Bernoulli
distributed random variables with p = 0.5
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Y = εY
P (x, y) y=0 y=1 P (x)
x=0 1/4 1/4 1/2
x=1 1/4 1/4 1/2
P (y) 1/2 1/2
Table 3.4: Observational distribution of invariant and independent model
P (y|x̂) y=0 y=1
x=0 1/2 1/2
x=1 1/2 1/2
Table 3.5: Interventional distributions of invariant and independent model
X and Y are clearly invariant and independent and the correlation and cau-
sation coefficients are 0. In other models, Z will act as a confounding variable, but
in this case, none of the variables causally effect each other.
3.5.2 Common causation
Hans Reichenbach appears to be the first to propose the “Principle of the Com-
mon Cause” claiming, “If an improbable coincidence has occurred, there must exist
a common cause” [68]. Elaborating on this, he suggests that correlation between
events A and B indicates either that A causes B, B causes A or A and B have a
common cause2 This philosophical claim naturally suggests the following definition:
2There are systems with correlated variables that do not have a common cause. For example,
Bell’s theorem states that a theory of local hidden variables is incompatible with quantum me-
chanics. These systems do not respect the causal Markov condition and are excluded from analysis
here. Arguably, this correlation without causation is why these systems are so often considered
counterintuitive.
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Common Causation X and Y are said to experience common causation when X
and Y are mutually invariant but not independent.
This effect is sometimes referred to as a ‘spurious relationship’ or ‘spurious
correlation’ — a term Pearson originally coined in [63]. This risks conflating three
distinct concepts: the interventional distribution from which γ is calculated, the
population observational distribution from which ρ is calculated, and the finite-
sample observational distribution, from which the sample correlation coefficient, r
is computed. Consider the following scenarios:
• A small number of samples are taken from statistically independent X and Y ,
but due to random sampling errors, the sample correlation coefficient suggests
that X and Y are correlated.
• A large number of samples are taken from causally independent X and Y , but
due to a latent confounding variable, X and Y are correlated.
The second scenario is common causation. The first scenario is spurious cor-
relation due to random sampling error, informally, ‘coincidental correlation’. To
report such results as indicative of causality is to make two critical errors: conflat-
ing the finite-sample observational distribution with the population observational
distribution and conflating the observational distribution with the interventional
distribution.
An example of a common cause can be found in a study on myopia and ambient
lighting at night [65]. Development of myopia (short-sightedness) is correlated with
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night-time light exposure in children, although the latter does not cause the former.
The common cause is that short-sighted parents are likely to have short-sighted
children, and also more likely to set up night-lights.
As a simple example of common causation, consider the following model: Let
εX , εY , εZ be fair coins and X, Y and Z be defined by the following three equations:
Z = εZ
X = Z ∧ εX
Y = Z ∧ εY
P (x, y) y=0 y=1 P (x)
x=0 5/8 1/8 3/4
x=1 1/8 1/8 1/4
P (y) 3/4 1/4
Table 3.6: Observational distribution of common cause model
P (y|x̂) y=0 y=1
x=0 3/4 1/4
x=1 3/4 1/4
Table 3.7: Interventional distributions of common cause model
From the observational distribution, it is clear that X and Y are correlated
(ρ = 1/3) and from the interventional distributions, X and Y are invariant (γ = 0).
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3.5.3 Inverse causation
A classic veridical paradox observed by Martin Gardner is the relationship
between tuberculosis and dry climate [25]. At one point, Arizona, with one of the
driest climates in the United States was found to also have the largest share of
tuberculosis deaths. This is because tuberculosis patients greatly benefit from a dry
climate, and many moved there. This is isomorphic to the treatment of kidney stones
example, but with X as location (Arizona vs. not-Arizona), Y as tuberculosis death,
and Z as having tuberculosis. The following definition is proposed to characterize
this type of scenario.
Inverse causation X and Y are said to experience inverse causation when the corre-
lation coefficient ρ and natural causation coefficient γ have the opposite sign.
Inverse causation is of special importance when considering clinical treatment;
γ has the same sign as the average causal effect. A case of inverse causation is a case
where the correct treatment option is the opposite of what a naive interpretation of
correlation would suggest.
As a simple example of inverse causation, consider the following model: Let
εZ be a fair coin and εY be Bernoulli distributed with p = 3/4. The following model






¬Z if εY = 1
X if εY = 0
P (x, y) y=0 y=1 P (x)
x=0 1/8 3/8 1/2
x=1 3/8 1/8 1/2
P (y) 1/2 1/2
Table 3.8: Observational distribution of inverse causation model
P (y|do(x)) y=0 y=1
x=0 5/8 3/8
x=1 3/8 5/8
Table 3.9: Interventional distributions of inverse causation model
“Inverse causation” is not a standard term. It is suggested here to avoid
confusion with other, similar sounding terms. ‘Anti-causation’ is inappropriate, as
‘anti-causal filters’ in digital signal processing are filters whose output depend on
future inputs. ‘Reverse causation’ is also inappropriate - this is already in popular
use to refer to mistakenly believing that Y has a causal effect on X, when X actually
causes Y .
3.5.4 Unfaithfulness
As discussed in the Background chapter, the causal Markov condition entails
a set of conditional independences between variables corresponding to nodes in a
DAG G. Sprites [79] introduced the faithfulness assumption (also referred to as
stability [57]) as the converse.
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Definition 3.5.1 (Faithfulness condition [79]) A distribution P is faithful to a
DAG G if no conditional independence relations other than the ones entailed by the
Markov property are present.
This is a global condition, applying to a joint probability distribution and
a DAG. I suggest the following condition as the local analogue for two random
variables X and Y in a causal model, which can only occur if the (global) faithfulness
condition is violated:
Unfaithful X and Y are said to be unfaithful if they are independent but not in-
variant.
Theorem 3.5.2 If X and Y are unfaithful in causal model M , then the observa-
tional distribution P and causal diagram G associated with M violate the faithfulness
condition.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that Y is not invariant to X,
then P (y | x̂ is a non-constant function of x. Therefore, X is an ancestor of Y in
the associated causal diagram and X and Y are d-connected. However, X and Y
are independent, an independence relation not entailed by the Markov condition.
Therefore the observational distribution P is not faithful to G. 
For Bernoulli random variables, X and Y are unfaithful if and only if ρ = 0
and γ 6= 0.
The following model is a simple example where X and Y are unfaithful. Let






¬Z, if εY = 1
X, if εY = 0
P (x, y) y=0 y=1 P (x)
x=0 1/4 1/4 1/2
x=1 1/4 1/4 1/2
P (y) 1/2 1/2
Table 3.10: Observational distribution of unfaithful X and Y
P (y|do(x)) y=0 y=1
x=0 3/4 1/4
x=1 1/4 3/4
Table 3.11: Interventional distributions of unfaithful X and Y
3.5.4.1 Friedman’s thermostat and the traitorous lieutenant
As an example of a model that exhibits unfaithfulness, consider “Friedman’s
Thermostat”, comparing a central bank to a thermostat. A correctly functioning
thermostat would keep the indoor temperature constant, regardless of the external
temperature by adjusting the furnace settings.3 Observation would show external
temperature and furnace settings to be anti-correlated with each other and internal
3Friedman introduced the thermostat analogy in the context of a central bank controlling money









Figure 3.2: The traitorous lieutenant problem
temperature to be uncorrelated with both. This does not correspond to the true
causal effect that external temperature and furnace settings have on internal tem-
perature and the lack of a direct causal effect between external temperature and
furnace settings. Friedman argued analogously that from the mid 1980s to early
2000s, the Federal reserve successfully controlled money supply to stabilize prices,
despite changes in demand for money [22].
The sharp-eyed reader will note that Freidman’s thermostat is not a recur-
sive (acyclic) causal model. An example of unfaithfulness with a recursive (acyclic)
causal model can be seen in the following “Traitorous Lieutenant” problem. Con-
sider the problem of a general trying to send a one-bit message. The general has
two lieutenants available to act as messengers, however, one of them is a traitor and
will leak whatever information they have to the enemy. The general observes the
following protocol: to send a 1, the general either gives the first lieutenant a 1 and
the other a 0, or the first a 0 and the second a 1, with equal probability. To send a
0, the general either gives both lieutenants a 0, or both lieutenants a 1, with equal
probability. The recipient of the message XORs both lieutenants’ bits to recover
the original message.
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3.5.4.2 The measure of unfaithful models
Arguably, X and Y being unfaithful is the worst possible case - further study
on the relationship between two variables may be considered unwarranted due to the
lack of any detectable correlation, despite the existence of a causal effect between
the two.
Unfaithful models serves as a counterexample to Tufte’s maxim, “Correlation
is necessary but not sufficient for causation”. However, there is a sense in which it
is true. Almost all models are faithful in a formal sense - models that do not respect
the faithfulness condition have Lebeguse measure zero in probability spaces where
model parameters have continuous support and are independently distributed [79].
However, this does not mean that such models can be dismissed out of hand; they
are vanishingly unlikely to occur by chance, but can be deliberately engineered, as
seen with Freidman’s Thermostat and the Traitorous Lieutenant examples.
It may be tempting to conclude that Tufte’s maxim holds in practice; that,
since unfaithful models have measure zero, they can be considered ‘pathological’ and
reasonably excluded from most analysis. However, there is still an important sense
in which this fails; nearly unfaithful distributions have nonzero ‘surprisingly large’
measure4 [83]. In the limit of infinite samples (i.e. the population distribution),
correlation in such models will be nonzero but with a finite number of samples, the
level of correlation will be statistically indistinguishable from zero.
4Formally, the measure of λ-strong-unfaithful distributions converges to 1 exponentially in the
number of nodes.
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3.5.5 Genuine causation and confounding bias
The remaining possibility is that the causation and correlation coefficient share
the same sign. A special case is when they are equal, which, for Bernoulli random
variables is equivalent to no-confounding ; the definition of no-confounding is pro-
vided by Pearl [60].
Definition 3.5.3 (No-confounding) X and Y are not confounded if and only if
P (y|x̂) = P (y|x)
By the definition of the natural causal coefficient, no-confounding implies ρ =
γ. For Bernoulli random variables, the converse also holds.
When γ and ρ are not equal, but share the same sign, then correlation in-
dicates a genuine causal effect, although the strength of the causal effect may be
greater or weaker than the magnitude of the correlation coefficient. This disserta-
tion suggests that this class of models be referred to as showing genuine causation
(with confounding bias).
Genuine causation with negative confounding bias corresponds to γ > ρ and
can be thought of as a weaker version of a confounding effect that can produce
unfaithfulness or inverse causation. In such cases, the true causal effect will be
stronger than correlation suggests. As an example, consider the following model






¬Z, if εY = 1
X, if εY = 0
P (x, y) y=0 y=1 P (x)
x=0 3/8 1/8 1/2
x=1 1/8 3/8 1/2
P (y) 1/2 1/2
Table 3.12: Observational distribution for genuine causation with negative bias
model
P (y|do(x)) y=0 y=1
x=0 7/8 1/8
x=1 1/8 7/8
Table 3.13: Interventional distributions for genuine causation with negative bias
model
Genuine causation with positive confounding bias example can be thought of
as a common cause effect, combined with genuine causation and therefore the true
causal effect will be weaker than the correlation suggests. In the following model,
ρ ≈ 0.745, the natural causation coefficient, γ ≈ 0.447 and the maximum entropy
causation coefficient, γH = 0.5. Given εX , εY , εZ are fair coins:
Z = εZ




Z, if εY = 1
X, if εY = 0
P (x, y) y=0 y=1 P (x)
x=0 5/8 1/8 3/4
x=1 0 1/4 1/4
P (y) 5/8 3/8
Table 3.14: Observational distribution for genuine causation with positive bias
model
P (y|do(x)) y=0 y=1
x=0 3/4 1/4
x=1 1/4 3/4
Table 3.15: Interventional distributions for genuine causation with positive bias
model
3.6 Visualizing and measuring γρ
Plotting γ against ρ provides a way to visualize and measure a distribution
of models, forms of meta-model analysis. A γρ plot is a graph where each point
represents a single model. The taxonomy of correlation/causation relationships can
be visually represented in such a graph. The origin, i.e. ρ = 0, γ = 0 corresponds
to independence and invariance. The horizontal line γ = 0 corresponds to common
causation. The vertical line ρ = 0 corresponds to unfaithful models. The upper left
and lower right quadrants are models that exhibit inverse causation. The other two
quadrants are models that exhibit genuine causation, with the line y = x denoting
no-confounding. All of these relationships are shown in Figure 3.3.
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(a) Common causation (b) Unfaithfulness
(c) Inverse causation (d) Genuine causation
Figure 3.3: γρ plots visualizing the correlation/causation taxonomy; each point
on a plot corresponds to a model. The vertical γ-axis can be seen as strength of
causation between two variables in the model, and the horizontal ρ-axis the strength
of correlation between two variables in the model. For models with Bernoulli random
variables, the line ρ = γ corresponds to no-confounding.
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The example models described in the correlation/causation taxonomy section
provide a constructive proof that correlation provides no guarantees about causation,
even for models with only three variables. Correlation is indeed not causation, but
this does not explain why this mistake is easy to make in practice.
Some insight can be found by considering the space of all linear models with
a single confounding variable Z. Given jointly independent error terms, εX , εY , εZ
with finite variance and support over the entire real line, this class of linear causal
models can be parameterized by σ2εX , σ
2
εY
, σ2εZ , αZ , βX , βZ
Z = εZ
X = αZZ + εX
Y = βXX + βZZ + εY
Since these models are linear, and covariance is bilinear, the population corre-
lation coefficient can be calculated analytically, regardless of the underlying distri-
















+ σ2εY + (αZβX + βZ)
2σ2εZ )
The natural causation coefficient can also be calculated directly from the def-



























The “typical” relationship between correlation and causation can be analyzed
by constructing a probability distribution for the parameters of the linear model.
αZ , βX , βZ have support over the entire real line; σ
2
εX




(0,∞). Assuming mean 0 and variance 1, the maximum entropy distributions are
N(0, 1) and exp(1), respectively.
Given these jointly independent distributions over the parameter space, it is
possible to sample random linear models. This is not drawing random samples of
X and Y from a linear model, but rather, drawing random linear models from the
space of possible linear models of X, Y and Z, as described above.
Monte Carlo integration yields estimates of the probability of encountering
the possible relationships between correlation and causation, in the class of models
being sampled. Specifically, given a random model, the probability that it shows
inverse causation ≈ 0.122, genuine causation with negative bias ≈ 0.364 and genuine
causation with positive bias ≈ 0.514. A kernel density estimation plot of this model
space can be seen in Figure 3.4.
This matches closely to intuition. One would expect that, on average, a strong
positive correlation indicates a strong positive causal effect - this can be seen in the
upper right quadrant, where the (smooth) density estimation is darkest. Inverse
causation is possible, although less likely, and unfaithful models have measure 0,
which accounts for their unintuitive nature. It is vanishingly unlikely to encounter
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Figure 3.4: A smoothed plot of γ vs. ρ calculated for random linear models of 3
variables (treatment X, response Y and confounder Z). In the majority of models,
correlation and causation nearly coincide, especially in the high-density regions in
the upper-right and lower-left quadrants. However, there remains a non-trivial per-
centage of models where correlation and causation do not coincide; in particular,
the fraction of models exhibiting inverse causation ≈ 0.122
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an unfaithful model unless it was deliberately created. However, more pessimisti-
cally, the measure of models that are almost unfaithful is not zero. This is an
analysis of population coefficients; finite-sample errors mean that we cannot dismiss
unfaithfulness as being irrelevant.
The choice of a maximum entropy distribution in this analysis is based on the
principle of maximum entropy, which states that the appropriate prior distribution,
given the absence of any other information, is the maximum entropy distribution.
This is supported by arguments Jaynes and Wallis [41] [42], although these argu-
ments are by no means universally accepted. However, the important result is not
that inverse causation only occurs in ≈ 12% of models but that these results are
consistent with intuition that correlation is ‘usually’ indicative of causation.
γρ plots are not limited to this particular analysis — they can be used in any
analysis where a distribution over model space is available.
3.7 Summary of correlation/causation fallacies
Correlation does not imply causation, and, contrary to popular belief, the
converse holds as well. Yet, in practice, the two measures are often compatible with
each other. The taxonomy presented in this chapter, and the visualization of model
space suggests that no single epigram that will suffice to warn researchers about
how they can be confused in practice.
Cases of genuine causation (and invariance and independence) correspond to
the naive notion that correlation and causation approximately coincide. The rest
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of the taxonomy captures the scenarios in which they are not: inverse causation,
common causation and, albeit with a vanishingly small measure of models, unfaith-
fulness; these are the population (Heckman task 2) ways in which correlation and
causation fail to coincide. Taking estimation (Heckman task 3) into account adds
coincidental/spurious correlation and a non-trivial measure of unfaithfulness to the
menagerie. Finally, outside of this taxonomy entirely, the existing term ‘reverse
causation’ refers to those scenarios in which the causal effect of X on Y is mistaken
for Y on X or vise-versa.
Tufte’s maxim, “Correlation is not causation, but it sure is a hint” is tempting.
It is true in the sense that a random model will likely have ρ ≈ γ. However,
there remains a nontrivial possibility of encountering other correlation/causation
relationships such as inverse causation, a problem that no amount of additional
data sampling will mitigate. Although it does not directly advance any methods
to solve causal inference in practice, the γρ plot serves the purpose of acting as a
visual description of the following principle: data is simply no substitute for accurate
causal assumptions.
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Chapter 4: Causal programming (theory)
The purpose of abstraction is not to be vague, but to create a new
semantic level in which one can be absolutely precise.
—Edsger W. Dijkstra
4.1 Introduction
Computer science, in general, and programming languages, in particular, are
built on abstractions. The essence of a good abstraction is one that isolates the
user from the irrelevant, while preserving access to the relevant details. Declarative
programming abstractions permit expressing the logic of computation without de-
scribing the control flow, separating the ‘what’ of computation from the ‘how’. This
is programming in the more ‘mathematical’ sense (e.g. logic programming, linear
programming). One indicator as to how successful such a language is in this regard is
how well the language corresponds to the mathematical theory it is based on, with-
out requiring any additional statements from the user about how the computation
is to be performed.
A related problem, but somewhat in opposition to the goal of declarative pro-
gramming, is providing performance and completeness guarantees. In general, it be-
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comes more difficult for the implementation of more powerful declarative languages
to guarantee an efficient runtime, or even guarantee that the underlying computa-
tion will terminate. For example, Prolog, despite being based on a restricted subset
of first-order logic, is still powerful enough to express arbitrary computation and is
thus unable to provide termination guarantees.
This chapter considers the issue of designing effective causal programming
abstractions, independent of implementation. One of the key problems is how to
group the different mathematical objects used in causal inference into distinct con-
cepts that are compatible with human intuition. This chapter presents baseline
abstractions of: model, data/distribution, query and formula, and considers causal
inference to be the problem of finding instances of a logical relation that satisfy
given criteria. This can be viewed as an axis of abstraction that builds on, but is
conceptually distinct from, the Heckman Hierarchy. The tasks in Heckman Hierar-
chy work ‘forward’ — starting with the definition of models and known probabilities
and identifying model parameters. By casting causal inference as a logical relation,
it is possible to consider inference in ‘any direction’, with the goal of unifying dif-
ferent causal inference problems in the same theoretical framework. In this sense,
causal programming is a meta-theory; this chapter introduces high-level abstrac-
tions, which can be instantiated to develop a theory of causal inference that can be
implemented in practice.
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4.2 Causal inference as a logical relation




• M is a set of structural causal models
• D is a set of distributions ; specifically, a set of known probability functions
• Q is a query from the causal hierarchy
• F is a formula that computes Q as a function of D, for every model in M
• V is the set of endogenous variables under consideration
The causal inference relation is indexed by V ; there is a relation for each
set of endogenous variables. V can be thought of as the set of all variables under
consideration that can be potentially manipulated and/or measured.
M is a (possibly infinite) set of structural causal models, described by some
finite set of model assumptions. The main focus of this dissertation is on the use of
causal diagrams, typically denoted G, to denote such sets of models. For example,
a researcher might consider the set of all structural causal models of the form:
X = fX(εX)
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Y = fY (Z, εY )
Z = fZ(X, εZ)
where εX 6⊥⊥ εY , that is to say, εX and εY are not independent. This can
represent a variant of the smoking/cancer example, where X is smoking, Z is tar,
and Y is cancer, i.e. tar mediates the effect of smoking on cancer, but there may be
a latent factor that causally affects both smoking and cancer. This set of structural
causal models is represented by the causal diagram in Figure 4.1.
X YZ
Figure 4.1: A causal diagram where the effect of X on Y is mediated by Z. In addi-
tion, X and Y share a latent common cause; equivalently the background variables
for X and Y are not independent.
In principle, M could be described by any restriction on the set of all recursive
structural causal models; this includes such assumptions as conditional independence
assumptions between potential outcome variables (e.g. Yx ⊥⊥ X), or restrictions on
the functional relationships, such as the assumption that all fi’s are linear. However,
in this dissertation, the set of all causal diagrams over V will serve as the main
example of the domain of M .
D is a set of known population probability functions, e.g. the joint ‘obser-
vational’ probability function P (v) over all of the endogenous variables. For the
model in Figure 4.1, P (v) would be the joint probability function P (x, y, z). Unless
otherwise stated, it will be assumed that all probability distributions are strictly
positive, i.e. P (v) 6= 0,∀v, as this is required by many theorems in causal inference.
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D can be extended to include other types of population probabilities. For ex-
ample, it may be the case that, in addition to the observational probability function,
the interventional distributions for a limited subset of variables is available. Such a
D can be represented as P (v | do(z′)),∀Z ′ ⊆ Z, where Z is some subset of V that
can be directly manipulated. Note that this includes the observational probability
distribution, as P (v | do(z′)) = P (v) when Z ′ is the empty set.
Note that by definingD as a set of known probability functions, D also includes
information about conditional independences between variables (e.g. knowledge of
the probability function P (x, y) includes information about whetherX ⊥⊥ Y ). When
necessary to distinguish between symbolic information about the distribution (e.g.
P (v) is known) and the numerical probabilities, this dissertation refers to the former
as the signature and the latter as the distribution.
Q can be any query from the causal hierarchy: statistical/associational (e.g.
P (y | x)), interventional/causal (e.g. P (y | do(x))) or counterfactual (e.g. P (Yx |
Zw)). The main focus in this dissertation is on causal effect queries, queries of the
form P (y | do(x)), where y and x are disjoint subsets of V .
Finally, the formula, F , computes Q as a function of D, in all models entailed
by M . In principle, F could be extended to include bounds on probabilities, but
the focus of this dissertation is on exact results.
The simplest problem involving the causal inference relation, hereby dubbed
“causal checking”, is determining whether a given tuple 〈M,D,Q, F 〉 is an instance
of the causal inference relation. For example, M = (Figure 4.1), D = P (x, y, z),
Q = P (y | do(x)), and F = ∑z P (y | x, z)P (z) is a valid instance of the relation.
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The same tuple, but with F = P (y | x) instead is not an instance the relation, since
this F does not correctly compute the query in all models entailed by M .
The causal inference relation provides a general framework for analyzing prob-
lems in causal inference. Many problems in causal inference can be seen as finding an
instance, or enumerating all the instances, of the causal inference relation that sat-
isfy given criteria. These problems can be broadly categorized by which of M,D,Q
are given:
• M,D,Q - Identification: the problem of finding a formula to compute a causal
query
• D,Q - Causal discovery: the problem of enumerating the models that are
compatible with given population probabilities distributions
• M,Q - Research design: the problem determining the observational and/or
experimental data that must be collected to answer a given query
• M,D - Query generation: the problem of enumerating identifiable queries
Note that problems where F is given are not considered, as they represent
methodologically suspect practices. For example, searching for M , given D, Q and
F is an attempt to find a post hoc rationalization for a calculation of a causal effect
that has already been performed.
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4.3 Identification
Consider the variant of the smoking/cancer model described in Figure 4.1.
Furthermore, suppose that an analyst knows the joint pre-intervention distribution,
P (x, y, z), and wishes to compute the causal effect of X on Y , P (y | do(x)).
This corresponds to the following problem: find one instance of the causal
inference relation such that M = (Figure 4.1), D = P (x, y, z), Q = P (y | do(x)).
An appropriate F can be identified using the rules of the causal calculus (Theorem
2.8.1). A full solution to this problem is 〈M,D,Q, F 〉 where M,D and Q are as
given, and F is:
∑
z
P (z | x)
∑
x′
P (y | x′, z)P (x′)
It is possible for there to be several instances of the causal inference rela-
tion that satisfy given criteria. For example, the instances of the causal inference
relation that satisfy M = (Figure 4.2), D = P (x, y, z), Q = P (y | do(x)) includes
solutions 〈M,D,Q, F1〉 and 〈M,D,Q, F2〉, where F1, again, is
∑
z P (z | x)
∑
x′ P (y |
x′, z)P (x′), and F2 is simply P (y | x). In an identification problem, the solutions
are equivalent in the sense that for a given D, they will all compute the same value
for the query. However, there are other causal inference problems where finding
multiple solutions is of interest.
Conversely, there may be no instances of the causal inference relation that
satisfy given criteria. Attempting to find an instance of the causal inference relation
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X YZ
Figure 4.2: A causal diagram without latent confounding. Unlike the causal diagram
in Figure 4.1, there is no latent common cause of X and Y . The causal effect
P (y | do(x)) is equal to the conditional probability P (y | x).
that satisfies M = (Figure 4.3), D = P (x, y, z), Q = P (y | do(x)) will fail; Q cannot
be uniquely computed in all models entailed by M .
X YZ
Figure 4.3: A causal diagram where P (y | do(x)) is not identifiable. Intuitively,
there is a latent common cause that affects X, Y and Z, so it is not possible to
determine if any observed covariation is due to the effect of X on Z on Y , or if the
common cause is responsible.
Treating the full tuple 〈M,D,Q, F 〉 as the solution, as opposed to just the
formula, F , may seem redundant for identification problems. The utility of this
approach becomes more apparent for less restrictive search criteria.
4.4 Causal discovery
If a causal diagram is not specified, then causal inference becomes a problem
of causal discovery. As a simple example, consider an analyst that is studying a
system with just two endogenous variables, X, and Y . Suppose the analyst knows
that the variables are dependent, knows the joint observational probability function,
i.e. D = P (x, y), where X 6⊥⊥ Y , and wishes to infer the causal effect of X on Y ,
i.e. Q = P (y | do(x)).
A causal diagram and probability function are said to be Markov compati-
ble if the probability function respects the conditional independences implied by
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X Y X Y X Y
X Y X Y
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e)
Figure 4.4: Causal diagrams that are Markov compatible with X 6⊥⊥ Y .
the Markov condition (Definition 2.6.1). There are three causal diagrams that are
Markov compatible with D that also permit identification of Q: M1 = (Figure 4.4a),
M2 = (Figure 4.4b), M3 = (Figure 4.4c). This corresponds to the following in-
stances of the causal relation: 〈M1, D,Q, F1〉, 〈M2, D,Q, F2〉, 〈M3, D,Q, F3〉 where:
F1 = P (y | x)
F2 = F3 = P (y)
If the domain of M is limited to the space of Markovian causal diagrams,
then this set of solutions is also complete, in the sense that every causal diagram
that is Markov compatible with D is contained in one of the enumerated instances
of causal inference relation (〈M1, D,Q, F1〉 and 〈M2, D,Q, F2〉). However, if the
domain of M also includes semi-Markovian causal diagrams, then there are several
causal diagrams that are compatible with D that do not permit identification of Q.
Note that any causal diagram where all endogenous variables share a com-
mon, latent cause is Markov compatible with every joint observational probability
function P (v). This has consequences for interpreting the results of causal discov-
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ery. It is generally incorrect to treat causal discovery as definitively determining
the causes of variables in a system. Instead, a discovered model can be viewed as a
set of additional, compatible assumptions that will permit answering a given query.
Causal discovery will usually be incomplete, since non-identifiable models remain a
possibility, unless explicitly ruled out by domain knowledge.
Causal discovery algorithms generally rely on the assumption that P is faithful
to G (this condition is also called ‘stability’ [57]), which is the assumption that every
conditional independence relationship that is true in P is entailed by the Markov
condition [79]. For example, if I = P (x, y), where X ⊥⊥ Y , then P is Markov
compatible with every diagram in figure 4.4. However, P is not faithful to any
of these diagrams; intuitively, the edges between X and Y suggest a dependency
between the variables that is not present.
4.5 Research design
If the data/distribution is not specified, then causal inference becomes a prob-
lem of research design. As an example, consider a scenario where an analyst wishes







Figure 4.5: A causal diagram, adapted from [56], that permits identifying P (y |
do(x)) in multiple ways.
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The complete joint observational probability function P (v) is sufficient, but
unnecessary. In particular, an analyst may be interested in calculating causal ef-
fect from less information when it is expensive, or otherwise difficult to obtain the









P (y | w4, w5, x)P (w4, w5)
Solutions are sensitive to the domain and representation of D. One possible
representation of D1 is P (y | w3, w4, x), P (w3, w4). However, this implies a some-
what cumbersome domain for D and can make it difficult to determine equivalent
distributions. For example, the probability functions P (y | x), P (x) are semanti-
cally, but not syntactically, equivalent to P (x, y). A less expressive, but simpler
domain for D is the set of joint observational probability functions over subsets of
V . This domain has a natural partial order: P (v1), is included in a more general
distribution, P (v2), if V1 ⊂ V2. In this context, minimal distributions to calculate
P (y | do(x)) are D1 = P (x, y, w3, w4) and D2 = P (x, y, w4, w5).
87
4.6 Query generation
If the query is not specified, then causal inference becomes a problem of query
generation. Note that the number of identifiable queries has the potential to be
very large. For example, if D = P (v), and M is a Markovian causal diagram,
then all queries of the form P (y1, . . . , ym | do(x1, . . . , xn)) are identifiable, which is
exponential in |V |. Tractable query generation will generally require some restriction
on the space of queries or a willingness to accept an incomplete set of solutions.
As a simple example of query generation, consider the problem of generating
all queries that either involve the causal effect on Y , i.e. P (y | do(. . .)) or involve
manipulating x, i.e. P (. . . | do(x))), with M = (figure 4.6) and D = P (v). Two
such queries are identifiable: Q1 = P (y | do(x)), and Q2 = P (z | do(x)).
X Z Y
Figure 4.6: A semi-Markovian causal diagram that permits identifying P (y | do(x))
and P (z | do(x)) but not P (y | do(z))
Query generation can be combined with the other causal inference tasks. For
example, starting with a known joint probability function, causal discovery can enu-
merate Markov compatible models, with query generation to enumerate identifiable
queries for each Markov compatible model.
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4.7 The Causal and Heckman Hierarchies revisited
Much like how the Causal Hierarchy outlines the possible questions that may
be asked in the course of causal inference, and the Heckman Hierarchy outlines dis-
tinct tasks arising from the analysis of causal models, causal programming outlines
the different types of different causal inference goals. Causal programming acts as
a separate axis of abstraction, one that builds upon, unifies and extends existing
problems and concepts in causal modeling and inference.
The causal programming concept of a model corresponds precisely to the first
causal inference task in the Heckman Hierarchy and the causal programming concept
of a query corresponds precisely to the Causal Hierarchy. Identification (Heckman
task 2) problems are ‘forward’ inference in causal programming: starting with the
definition of a model, the signature of a distribution, and a query to infer a formula.
Evaluating the formula for a given empirical distribution corresponds to estimation
(Heckman task 3).
Causal programming’s formulation of causal discovery is named after the exist-
ing literature on causal discovery algorithms [66]. This roughly corresponds to two
‘backwards’ steps in the Heckman Hierarchy. First, using real data (part of Heck-
man task 3) to determine conditional independences (i.e. properties of population
distributions, part of Heckman task 2). Then, given these conditional indepen-
dence assumptions, generating a set of compatible causal models (i.e. Heckman
task 1). The traditional definition of causal discovery is simply the problem of find-
ing compatible causal models, given probability distributions. Causal programming
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further assumes that the ultimate goal is to actually answer some given query. Each
〈Mi, D,Q, Fi〉 tuple provides context to the solution; each compatible model Mi is
a model compatible with the given distribution, and the corresponding Fi identifies
the query for that set of compatible assumptions.
Causal programming’s formulation of research design is inspired by the existing
problem of experimental design, which is usually considered part of the third causal
inference task: considering problems of sensitivity and statistical power. Causal
programming’s research design is the rough equivalent, but for Heckman’s second
task. Instead of experimental design’s consideration of how to most effectively use
existing data, research design is the question of what data a researcher should try
to obtain.
Finally, query generation can be seen as an extension of determining the sta-
tistical implications of a model, e.g. reading conditional independence properties
from a graph via the d-separation criterion. Causal programming’s formulation of
query generation extends this to the problem of generating identifiable queries, in
general.
4.8 Restricted causal inference relation
The causal inference relation can be useful as a conceptual framework, but it
is not a practical way of analyzing causal inference problems unless the domains
of M , D and Q are appropriately restricted. Note that if M can include arbitrary
model assumptions, then conducting causal inference may require invoking arbitrary
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mathematical theorems!
Several previously studied problems can be cleanly expressed as special cases
of finding instances of the causal inference relation. In particular, identification
has several subproblems that permit complete algorithms, in the sense that if it
is possible to identify Q from M and D, then the algorithm is guaranteed to find
an appropriate F . This is illustrated as follows: Let G be a Markovian or semi-
Markovian causal diagram, P (v) be the joint observational probability function,
and W , X, Y , and Z each be subsets of V :
• Causal effect identification (ID) [39, 76]: M = G, D = P (v), Q = P (y | do(x))
• Conditional causal effect identification (IDC) [75]: M = G, D = P (v), Q =
P (y | w, do(x))
• Causal effect identification via surrogate experiments (zID) [5]: M = G, D =
P (v | do(z′)),∀Z ′ ⊆ Z, Q = P (y | do(x))
A zIDC algorithm, combining the capabilities of IDC and zID, would corre-
spond to M = G, D = P (v | do(z′)),∀Z ′ ⊆ Z, Q = P (y | w, do(x)). Finding a
complete algorithm for zIDC appears to be an open problem.
Causal discovery can be performed with Inductive Causation (IC) [62]. Given
a probability distribution P and assuming faithfulness, IC outputs a pattern, which
denotes an equivalence class of causal diagrams. If the underlying model is known
to be Markovian, then IC is also complete, in that the resulting pattern will corre-
spond to the complete set of causal diagrams that are Markov compatible with P .
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Figure 4.7: A marked pattern [57]. Marked edges denoted by an asterisk, e.g.
d→ e, signify a directed edge in the underlying model. Directed edges, e.g. b→ d,
represent either b→ d or a latent common cause of both b and d. Undirected edges,
e.g. a — b, represent either a← b, a→ b, or a latent common cause.
Inductive Causation leaves the details of some its steps unspecified. In par-
ticular, IC requires searching for a set Sab such that (a ⊥⊥ b | Sab) for every pair of
variables a and b in V , but does not specify how such sets should be found. The PC
algorithm [78] is a refinement of IC that runs in polynomial time on fixed-degree
graphs. The combination of IC-based algorithms and identification algorithms per-
mit finding instances of the causal inference relation that correspond to known D
and Q. For example, the combination of PC and ID would permit finding instances
of the causal inference relation that correspond to D = P (v), Q = P (y | do(x))
Problems related to research design have been discussed in the structural
causal model literature; for example, Pearl notes that the front-door and back-door
criteria permit an analyst a degree of freedom in selecting which set of covariates to
adjust for when calculating causal effect [57]. However, the more general problem
of finding instances of the causal inference relation corresponding to given M and
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Q does not appear to have an existing, standard formulation. Similarly, query gen-
eration is implicitly considered in the analysis of identification, but does not appear
to have been formulated as a problem in its own right.
All of these problems can be unified as special cases of finding instances of the
causal inference relation, with the following domains for M , D and Q:
• M : Markovian and semi-Markovian causal diagrams over V . Causal diagrams
can be represented as G = (V,E,C) where (V,E) forms a directed acyclic
graph and C is a confounding family of V , corresponding to the dashed edges
that represent latent confounding. A Sperner family is a collection of subsets
of a given set, such that none of the subsets contain any of the others [87].
This dissertation defines a confounding family of V to be a Sperner family of
V , with the further requirement that none of the subsets of V are singleton.
• D: Distributions that can be represented as P (w | do(z′)),∀Z ′ ⊆ Z, for a
given Z ⊆ W and W ⊆ V . Note that this is simply P (v) when W = V and
Z = ∅. This representation has a natural partial order: a distribution D1 is
said to be contained in another distribution D2 if W1 ⊆ W2 and Z1 ⊆ Z2.
• Q: Queries that can be represented as P (y | w, do(x)) for a given w ⊆ V, x ⊆
V, y ⊆ V , such that w, x and y are disjoint sets.
With respect to these domains, this dissertation suggests the following as
canonical formulations of causal inference problems:
• Identification (zIDC): Given M,D,Q, find one instance of the causal inference
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relation 〈M,D,Q, F 〉.
• Causal discovery: GivenD,Q, enumerate 〈Mi, D,Q, Fi〉 for distinctMi, i.e. for
any two enumerated instances of the causal inference relation, 〈M1, D,Q, F1〉
and 〈M2, D,Q, F2〉, M1 6= M2
• Research design: Given M,Q, enumerate 〈M,Di, Q, Fi〉, for distinct, mini-
mal Di, i.e. for any enumerated instance of the causal inference relation,
〈M,Di, Q, Fi〉, there does not exist another instance 〈M,Dj, Q, Fj〉 such that
Di is contained in Dj
• Query generation: Given M,D, enumerate 〈M,D,Qi, Fi〉 for distinct Qi
The combination of the axioms of probability theory and the inference rules
of Pearl’s causal calculus [56] are known to be complete for the ID, IDC and zID
problems [39, 75, 5]. I conjecture that they are complete for all of the problems
above as well. Furthermore, if a complete zIDC algorithm exists, it would con-
stitute a complete — albeit intractable, for larger |V | — solution for all of these
problems. Causal discovery, research design and query generation problems can be
reduced to identification problems by instantiating all possible Markov compatible
causal diagrams, distributions, or queries, respectively, and running an identification
algorithm for each instantiation.
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4.9 Other domains for the causal inference relation
Other problems in causal inference can be represented in the causal inference
relation framework by modifying the domain of the relation appropriately. In par-
ticular, the problems of identification of counterfactuals and recovery from selection
bias require only minor extensions to Q and D, respectively.
Identification of counterfactuals can be represented by extending the domain
of possible queries. Let G be a causal diagram, α and β be conjunctions of coun-
terfactual events, e.g. Yx, Zw, in the potential outcomes notation, and P∗ be the set
of all experiments, i.e. P (v | do(z′)),∀Z ′ ⊆ V . With respect to these domains, the
following problems are known to have complete algorithms [74]:
• Counterfactual identification (ID*): M = G, D = P∗, Q = P (α)
• Conditional counterfactual identification (IDC*): M = G, D = P∗, Q = P (α |
β)
Selection bias can be represented by extending distributions to include “s-
biased” data [6], i.e. P (v | S = 1), where S represents a binary indicator of entry
into the data pool. For example [3], in studying the effect of a training program on
earnings, subjects achieving higher incomes may tend to report their earnings more
frequently than those who earn less. Recovery from selection bias is the problem
of answering queries about the general population, despite the data being collected
under selection bias. This data may be accompanied by unbiased data, P (t), over
some subset T ⊂ V . Bareinboim [3] outlines several problems related to selection
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bias:
• Selection without external data: M = G, D = P (v | S = 1), Q = P (y | x)
• Selection with external data: M = G, D = P (v | S = 1), P (t), Q = P (y | x)
• Selection in causal inferences: M = G, D = P (v | S = 1), P (t), Q = P (y |
do(x))
Complete identification criteria exist for selection without external data. Suf-
ficient criteria and a valid algorithm for selection with external data and selection
in causal inferences exist, but are not known to be complete. In particular, iden-
tification in the presence of both selection bias and latent confounding (i.e. in
semi-Markovian models) is particularly difficult [3].
This formulation of the causal inference relation does not act as an exhaustive
survey of existing causal inference methods and algorithms for SCMs. There is no
notion of providing bounds for query, when an exact result cannot be computed [12].
Causal diagrams are the only form of model assumptions considered, which excludes
parametric assumptions and nonrecursive (i.e. cyclic) systems. And the problem of
external validity, i.e. generalizing results to a different environment from which the
original data was collected, is not considered [7].
In principle, the relation could be modified to represent these problems, but
this would add considerable complexity. Introducing problems into the framework
requires careful selection of the domains of M , D, Q and F to represent the problem
of interest, while still permitting a small set of complete inference rules.
96
4.10 Causal programming (optimization)
The causal inference relation casts problems in causal inference as the problem
of finding instances of a logical relation. A further generalization is casting causal
inference as an optimization problem. The generalized problem is to find optimal
instances of the causal inference relation with respect to a cost function:
minimize g(M,D,Q)
subject to ∃F : 〈M,D,Q, F 〉
and M ∈M∗, D ∈ D∗, Q ∈ Q∗
Where g is a cost function, ∃F : 〈M,D,Q, F 〉 is the statement that there exists
a formula such that 〈M,D,Q, F 〉 constitutes an instance of the causal inference
relation, and M∗, D∗, and Q∗ are the given domains for models, distributions and
queries under consideration.
A natural problem to consider in this framework is the problem of optimal
research design. For example, consider a scenario where an analyst wishes to calcu-
late P (y | do(x)) with respect to the causal diagram in figure 4.5. Since M and Q
are given, the only degree of freedom is in the domain of distributions; M∗ is just
a single causal diagram, i.e. M∗ = (figure 4.5) and Q∗ is just a single query, i.e.
Q∗ = P (y | do(x)).
Let the domain of distributions be all joint probability functions over subsets
of V , i.e. D∗ = P (w),∀W ⊆ V , and the cost function, g(D), be a linear cost
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function where including each wi in the joint probability function costs i, e.g. the
cost of P (v) = P (x, y, w1, w2, . . . w6) is 21. In this example, the solution would be
the instance of the causal inference relation: 〈M,D,Q, F 〉, where M and Q are as
given, D = P (x, y, w3, w4), and F =
∑
x3,x4
P (y | x,w3, w4)P (w3, w4), with a cost of
7.
As a function of D, g can be interpreted as the cost of performing observational
and/or experimental research, with the optimal instance of the causal inference rela-
tion representing the least expensive way to answer the original query. As a function
of M , g can be interpreted as the complexity of a model, with the optimal solution
representing the simplest set of additional assumptions that permit answering the
original query — a formalization of Occam’s razor. Finally, as a function of Q, g can
be interpreted as the (inverse, when minimizing g) value of being able to identify
a particular query, which can be combined with other causal inference tasks. For
example, given a causal model, but not an distribution or query, finding an opti-
mal instance of the causal inference relation would represent the finding the most
valuable, identifiable query, and the distribution required to compute it.
4.11 Relationship to the scientific method
Consider the steps involved in an idealized, simplified scientific method: Ob-
serve. Hypothesize. Predict. Experiment. (Repeat.) This corresponds well to tasks
associated with the causal inference relation. Observation corresponds to obtaining
a set of observational probabilities functions (D). Hypothesizing corresponds to
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causal discovery of compatible models (M). Prediction requires generating identifi-
able queries (Q). Finally, experimentation corresponds to obtaining interventional
probabilities that confirm or deny the prediction. This process can be repeated with
the interventional probabilities included in D.
In this sense, causal programming is framework for formalizing (part of) the
scientific method. At a high level, the abstractions of model, distribution, query
and formula are a guide to grouping different mathematical objects used in causal
inference. Defining precise domains for each of these abstractions makes it possible
rigorously consider questions regarding the soundness and completeness of corre-
sponding causal inference algorithms. What the causal programming framework
introduces is a unified way of considering a large class of different problems, a foun-
dation for building automated causal inference systems.
It is worth noting that causal programming does not — and is not designed
to — consider questions of ontology, i.e. the question of which factors, and how
these factors should be entered into formal analysis as model variables. The causal
inference relation assumes a known, fixed set of endogenous variables V . The ques-
tion of whether or not these variables adequately capture the relevant aspects of
a system being studied is beyond the scope of causal programming. In this sense,
causal programming is clearly not a complete framework for formalizing the scientific
process.
This limitation suggests an additional desideratum for any implementation of
causal programming: the resulting system should be interactive, to make it easy
for users to iteratively analyze and refine their models. The implementation of the
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identification portion of causal programming is the subject of the next chapter.
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Chapter 5: Causal programming (implementation)
When someone says: ‘I want a programming language in which I need
only say what I wish done’, give him a lollipop.
—Alan J. Perlis
5.1 Whittemore
This chapter introduces Whittemore,1 an implementation of causal program-
ming, focusing on the identification and estimation of interventional queries. Whitte-
more is implemented as an embedded, domain-specific language in Clojure, a dialect
of Lisp. The main significance of Whittemore is that it provides a declarative pro-
gramming language and interactive system for the full ‘pipeline’ of causal modeling
and inference. A user can start with ‘raw’ data, declare how it is to be interpreted as
a probability distribution, declare their model assumptions and calculate estimates
1The Yale shooting problem [31] is a scenario that is difficult to correctly formalize in first-
order logic. In the problem, Fred (later identified as a turkey) is initially alive and a gun is initially
unloaded. Loading the gun, waiting for a moment, and then shooting the gun is expected to kill
Fred. In one solution, Fred indeed dies. In another — also logically correct — solution, the gun
counterintuitively becomes unloaded and Fred survives. Similar ‘shooting’ problems are have been
used as examples when describing theories of causality [57] [30].
Samuel Whittemore was an early American farmer and soldier. A monument in Massachusetts
is inscribed: “Near this spot, Samuel Whittemore, then 80 years old, killed three British soldiers,
April 19, 1775. He was shot, bayoneted, beaten and left for dead, but recovered and lived to be
98 years of age.”
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of causal effect, all within the same system.
Several of the components that comprise the implementation of Whittemore
have been previously implemented elsewhere. I argue Whittemore is unique in its
strong emphasis on declarative programming: a user can specify what it is they want
computed, without having to specify details of program control flow. In addition,
the syntax of the programming language was designed to mimic the corresponding
mathematical syntax as closely as possible. The ultimate goal is to make conducting
causal inference no more difficult than writing down the corresponding mathematical
statements.
Whittemore is similar to other declarative programming languages that are
closely based on a mathematical theory. For example, logic/relational programming
languages (e.g. Prolog) are largely based on defining formulas in first-order logic
[9]. Probabilistic programming can be seen as a language for defining probabil-
ity distributions, with an operator that implements conditional sampling [49]. As
an implementation of the theory of causal programming, Whittemore can be seen
as being based on the theory of structural causal models, and comprised of two
operators: identification, which finds formulas that compute a causal query of in-
terest, and estimation which applies formulas to transform probability distributions
to other probability distributions. The goal of this chapter is to demonstrate the
viability of causal programming as a paradigm.
In particular, this required the (new) implementation of a purely functional
version of Shpitser’s ID algorithm [73] and designing a protocol/interface for prob-
ability distributions to enable seamless transitions between identification and esti-
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mation tasks. Since Whittemore is based on the ID algorithm, it is complete for the
class of queries it supports. If it fails to identify a causal effect, it is because it is
impossible to uniquely calculate the causal effect for the given model assumptions.
5.2 A motivating example
Before describing the design and implementation of the language, this section
presents a motivating example. The implementation of Whittemore has built-in
support for use in a Jupyter notebook [44]. The notebook interface automatically
renders certain objects as rich output, e.g. as tables or graphs instead of plain text.
This provides a user much faster feedback than a typical write-compile-run cycle,
or even a read-eval-print-loop interface; a user can type code and immediately be
presented with rich output. All code examples in this section are shown with their
automatically rendered outputs.
These examples use some additional functions that are not part of ‘core’ Whit-
temore. To load data, read-csv parses and processes a comma-separated values file;
head returns the first n samples for inspection. To visualize a probability distribu-
tion, plot-univariate returns a plot of a marginal distribution.
The example in this section is an analysis of the treatment of renal calculi
(i.e. kidney stones), using data from a real study [11]. This is the same example as
discussed in Chapter 3; renal-calculi.csv is a comma-separated value file that






The kidney-dataset is a dataset of 3 variables, each with two possible values.
The possible treatments were either open surgery or nephrolithotomy, the possible
kidney stone sizes were either large or small, and the final result of treatment was
either determined to be success, or failure. This dataset naturally lends to being
modeled as a joint categorical distribution.
The kidney-distribution (Figure 5.1) is the empirical probability distri-
bution associated with this study. This distribution exhibits Simpson’s paradox,
which despite being well known in the statistical literature, continues to “trap the
unwary” [15] [58]. In this distribution, the probability of success given surgery, i.e.
P (success = “yes” | treatment = “surgery”), is clearly less than the probability of
success given nephrolithotomy2:






Figure 5.1: The definition of the joint categorical kidney-distribution and plot
of the marginal distribution of the success variable.
(estimate kidney-distribution
(q {:success "yes"} :given {:treatment "surgery"}))
0.78
(estimate kidney-distribution
(q {:success "yes"} :given {:treatment "nephrolithotomy"}))
0.8257142857142857
However, a reversal appears when conditioning on subgroups. When restricted








(q {:success "yes"} :given {:size "small"
:treatment "nephrolithotomy"}))
0.8666666666666667
When restricted to observing patients with large kidney stones, surgery, again,
appears to be the superior treatment:
(estimate kidney-distribution




(q {:success "yes"} :given {:size "large"
:treatment "nephrolithotomy"}))
0.6875
In other words, when looking at small or large kidney stones, surgery ap-
pears to be the superior treatment, but when looking at the overall distribution,
nephrolithotomy appears to be the superior treatment. Resolving the paradox relies
on recognizing that deciding on a superior treatment involves answering interven-
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tional (level 2 of the Causal Hierarchy) queries, not associational queries (level 1).
The data in this study was drawn from an observational study, not a randomized
controlled trial. Specifically, the data was collected under circumstances where doc-
tors were more likely to send patients with larger kidney stones to surgery; in other
words, treatment was a function of kidney stone size. Success, in turn, was a func-
tion of both treatment and size. Given these circumstances, this distribution3 can
be viewed as being generated by the following model:
size = f1(ε1)
treatment = f2(size, ε2)
success = f3(treatment, size, ε3)
where each fi is some (unknown) function and each εi is an independent arbi-
trarily distributed background variable, representing factors outside of the model.
For example, success is not solely determined by treatment and kidney stone size.
Other factors (e.g. the skill of the surgeon) determine the final outcome, all of which
are agglomerated and represented by a single background variable.
Declaring these model assumptions as the charig1986 model in Whittemore is
straightforward. Note that Whittemore automatically generates and renders causal
diagram that corresponds to the given model assumptions:
3There is a subtlety: It is more accurate to say that the original kidney dataset was drawn
from some unknown (and unknowable) population distribution of medical outcomes, i.e. the
kidney-dataset is a collection of samples. The kidney-distribution is the empirical distri-










Determining the superior treatment is an interventional query, P (success |
do(treatment)). Given the model assumptions in charig1986, this can be deter-
mined as a function of the kidney-distribution, that is to say, a function of the
joint probability distribution over size, success, treatment. Whittemore readily
identifies the causal effect:
(identify charig1986
(q [:success] :do [:treatment]))
∑
size
P (size)P (success | size, treatment)
The output of identify is a Formula object. (Note that Whittemore au-
tomatically generates and renders LATEX math.) The formula correctly calculates
P (success | do(treatment)), for every structural causal model compatible with the
given causal diagram. In other words, it solves the corresponding identification
problem. An identification problem may be of interest in and of itself, however, the
goal in this example is not merely find such a formula. The goal is to determine
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which treatment is superior. This requires determining the actual interventional
probabilities. This is an identification task, followed by an estimation task.
The infer function is ‘syntactic sugar’, combining identification and estima-
tion into a single step:
(infer charig1986 kidney-distribution
(q {:success "yes"} :do {:treatment "surgery"}))
0.8325462173856037
(infer charig1986 kidney-distribution
(q {:success "yes"} :do {:treatment "nephrolithotomy"}))
0.778875
Despite the literature on resolving Simpson’s paradox, it continues to invoke
confusion or even outright disbelief [58]. Causal programming offers an alternative
solution: a user does not even have to be aware of the paradox to calculate the
correct causal effect. As seen in this example, causal programming, in general,
and Whittemore, specifically, encapsulates the underlying inference algorithms. It
provides a declarative language that only exposes those details that are necessary
to perform causal modeling and inference.
The rest of this chapter describes Whittemore’s syntax, semantics and imple-
mentation and includes additional usage examples.
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5.3 Syntax and semantics
Whittemore is defined as a total (i.e. always terminating), purely functional
subset of its host language. The reference implementation of Whittemore is in
Clojure, a dialect of Lisp [35]. Like Lisp, there are no statements; a causal program
is a sequence of expressions.
An expression in Whittemore is a constant, symbol, or (op expr *) where
op is a causal programming operator, and expr is an expression. Operators are
described using regular expression syntax: ? (optional), * (0 or more), + (1 or
more), with non-terminals denoted by italics.
〈expr〉 ::= 〈constant〉 | 〈symbol〉 | (〈op〉 〈expr〉∗)
〈op〉 ::= define | model | data | q | identify
| estimate | measure | signature | 〈distribution〉
Figure 5.2: Whittemore grammar
5.3.1 Constants
Constants in Whittemore are same as the host (Clojure) language. Con-
stants include standard atomic data types (e.g. integer and floating point numbers,
strings, booleans) as well as keywords, which are symbolic identifiers that evaluate
to themselves. Keywords begin with a colon and can contain alphanumeric char-
acters and special characters that are not reserved by the host language, e.g. :x,
:x’, :treatment, :z 1 are all valid keywords.
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In addition to the atomic data types, constants include the following collection
types, with literal syntax:
• Vectors are ordered collections of values, e.g. [:x :y]
• Maps are unordered collections that maps unique keys to values, e.g. {:x 0,
:y 1}
• Sets are unordered collection of unique values, e.g. #{:x :y}.
Keywords and sets are optional data types, in that strings can generally be used
in place of keywords, and vectors can be used in place of sets, without significantly
affecting the semantics of the program. This opens up the possibility of porting
Whittemore to other host languages that do not have the same built-in data types.
However, keywords and set notation are preferred in some cases where it is useful
to have a visual distinction.
5.3.2 Symbols
(define symbol docstring? value )
Symbols are identifiers that normally refer to another value. The define
operator binds a symbol to a value, and returns the value. ‘Pure’ Whittemore
cannot rebind symbols. This restriction is necessary for Whittemore to be a purely
functional language.
The implementation of Whittemore slightly relaxes this restriction — rebind-
ing a symbol is a warning rather than an error. Although this makes Whittemore
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impure, in practice, it is convenient to be able to redefine symbols, especially for
interactive usage.
5.3.3 Model
(model dag confounding *)
A model corresponds precisely to the concept of a semi-Markovian causal dia-
gram, representing a class of structural causal models. The model operator returns
a new Model where dag is a map of variables to their parents, and each confounding









Z = fZ(x, εZ)





Figure 5.3: An expression defining a model, the equivalent structural causal model
written as a system of equations, and the corresponding causal diagram. This set of
model assumptions corresponds to Z being a function of X and Y being a function





data produces a signature of a probability function, i.e. the symbolic in-
formation about a population probability distribution (Section 4.2). Whittemore
currently only supports representing knowledge of joint probability functions. For
example, knowledge of the joint probability function, P (x, y, z), is represented as
(data [:x :y :z]).
Note that this is not a representation of a particular probability distribution
or a particular dataset — it’s the symbolic representation of the joint probability
function a researcher expects to be able to obtain. Using Whittemore to conduct in-
ference with an explicit (data ...) can only yield symbolic formulas, not numerical
estimates.
5.3.5 Query
(q effect :do do ? :given given ?)
A Query is a statistical or causal query, such that the resulting value is a
probability distribution. For example, (q [:y] :given {:x 1}) corresponds to
P (y | X = 1), a statistical query. (q [:y 1 :y 2] :do {:x 0}) corresponds to
P (y1, y2 | do(X = 0)), a causal query. Whittemore does not currently support
counterfactual queries, although support is planned for a future release.
Note that since do and given are both optional, they are implemented as
keyword arguments in the host language. Their default values are the empty map.
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5.3.6 Formula
(identify model data ? query )
The identify operator returns a Formula that computes query, as a function
of data, in every SCM entailed by model, or a Fail, if such a Formula does not
exist. If unspecified, data defaults to the joint observational probability function
over all endogenous variables in model. For example, (identify front-door (q





P (y | x, z)P (x)
]
P (z | x)
where: x = 0
Note that Formulas follow lexical scoping rules, e.g. only the ‘outer’ x is
bound to 0. The implementation of Formulas is discussed in the “Implementation”
section.
The same identify expression, but with (data [:x :y]) returns a Fail
describing the hedge [74] that renders identification impossible. Since identify is
based on the ID algorithm [76], it is complete; a Fail will be returned if and only if
no appropriate Formula exists.
5.4 Identification examples
Identification is a purely symbolic task; the resulting formulas map population
distributions to causal effects, but, by themselves, do not perform any numerical
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calculations. This can still be useful by itself. Identification can inform a researcher
if the model assumptions they are willing to make and the data they plan to collect
will be enough to infer the queries of interest.
Identification in the kidney stone example is a case of a back-door4 adjustment










(q [:y] :do [:x]))
P (y | do(x)) =
∑
z
P (y | x, z)P (z)
As expected, Whittemore does not try to adjust for variables when doing so








4The back-door criterion is sufficient graphical criterion for adjustment; a set of variables Z
satisfies the back-door criterion relative to (X,Y ) if no node in Z is a descendant of X and Z
blocks (d-separates) every path between X and Y that contains an arrow into Y .
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(identify mediation
(q [:y] :do [:x]))
P (y | x)
By default, Whittemore assumes that the joint probability distribution func-
tion over all endogenous variables will be available, e.g. for endogenous variables
X, Y, Z, (data [:x :y :z]). If this is not the case, then Whittemore performs a
latent projection [79], converting the causal diagram to one that replaces the un-
known variables with latent variables (e.g. dashed, bidirected edges). For example,
if only the joint distribution of P (X, Y ) is available for the back-door model, then
identifying the causal effect of X on Y becomes impossible:
(identify back-door
(data [:x :y])
(q [:y] :do [:x]))
#whittemore.core.Fail{}
Identification fails (i.e. a Fail object is returned) in this case because it is
impossible to identify the causal effect P (y | do(x)) from just the joint probability
distribution P (y | do(x)).
Note that Whittemore is by no means limited to the special cases of back door
and front door adjustment [56]. Causal programming easily identifies formulas for
computing causal effect that involve non-standard adjustments:
(define concomitant-example
"Figure 1 (f) from (Shpitser 2008)"
(model
















P (x)P (z2 | x, z1)
]
P (z1 | x)P (y | x, z1, z2)
This is example is notable in that identifying P (y | do(x) requires summing
over post treatment variables — identification will fail if Z1 or Z2 is not available.
This is in stark contrast to the recommendation that that one should avoid summing
over post-treatment variables to avoid introducing bias [53].
5.5 Implementation (identification)
The syntax of probability theory is weakly typed, and heavily overloaded. For
example, even when restricted to associational/statistical queries, the symbol P ()
has several meanings in mathematics. P (y | x) is a function from values of X to
probability distributions of Y ; P (y | X = x) is a particular probability distribution;
P (Y = y | X = x) is a particular probability value, i.e. a real number between 0
and 1. In each case, the syntax is identical, but each expression has a different type.
In addition to supporting this syntax, for an implementation of causal pro-
gramming to be fully declarative, it has to be purely functional — any portion
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of code that manipulates state is complected with every other piece of code that
manipulates the same state.
Clojure is well suited to implementing causal programming. The language has
literal syntax for (immutable) vectors and maps and is dynamically typed which
makes it possible for Whittemore to closely match the syntax of the corresponding
mathematics. Lisp dialects, in general, blur the line between an API/library and a
language. Whitemore is implemented as a library, but acts as a sublanguage — it’s
possible to code in ‘pure’ Whittemore, with strong termination and completeness
guarantees, while still being able to write more general code in the host language,
as necessary.
Currently, the identify operator is an implementation of Shpitser’s ID algo-
rithm. The ID algorithm and several related algorithms have been previously imple-
mented in the R programming language [81]. Unlike this previous implementation,5
Whittemore’s identify is purely functional. In addition, Whittemore natively sup-
ports estimation of causal effects (described later in this chapter) and has a strong
emphasis on interactive ‘notebook’ usage.
The Model, Data, Query and Formula types are all implemented as persistent
(immutable) hash array mapped tries (HAMT) [2] which support lookup and ‘mod-
ification’ — associating a key and value creates a new data structure (Figure 5.4)
— in log32N time.
6 This provides good performance while remaining free of side
5Whittemore was designed independently; I became aware of Tikka and Karven’s implementa-
tion after beginning work on Whittemore.
6In asymptotic analysis, this is no different than the O(logN) performance of a binary tree.
Empirically, HAMTs enjoy performance that rivals other (mutable) implementations of the asso-
ciative array abstract data type.
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effects. A considerable advantage is that the data structures can be freely shared
with any other part of a program; it is impossible to corrupt a data structure since
none of them can be changed.
Figure 5.4: The HAMT is effectively an 32-tree, which can be used to implement a
map (associative array) data type. ‘Modifying’ (e.g. changing a value for one of the
key-value pairs) an existing map leaves the original map unchanged. A new map is
created, one that mostly shares structure with the original for efficiency [35].
Models, i.e. causal diagrams, are represented in a modified adjacency-list
format; models are a map, whose keys are :pa and :bi, and whose values are
another map, and a set of sets, respectively (Figure 5.5). These correspond to the
two type types of edges that must be kept track of: directed edges and bidirected
edges. Directed edges (:pa) are represented as a map of vertices to the set of their
parents. Bidirected edges (key :bi) are implemented as a set of sets representing
pairs of edges. When used in a Jupyter notebook, these are automatically rendered
as causal diagrams via the Graphviz [24] graph visualization software.
The ID algorithm relies on ‘modified’ graphs, e.g. GX , the graph where all of
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{:pa {:x #{}, :y #{:z}, :z #{:x}},
:bi #{#{:x :y}}}
Figure 5.5: The front-door model as a map. X has no parents, Y has the parent
Z, and Z has the parent X. In addition, there exists a bidirected edge between X
and Y . During interactive ‘notebook’ usage, models are automatically rendered as
causal diagrams (Figure 5.3).
the incoming edges to nodes X are removed. Since all Whittemore data structures
are immutable, the ‘modified’ graph can be safely created without affecting the
original.
Formulas are defined as a map of bindings of variables to values, and a form,
which is defined recursively:
• {:p #{vars } :given #{vars }}
• {:sum form :sub #{vars }}
• {:prod #{forms }}
• {:numer form :denom form }
These forms correspond to a probability expression, summation, product, and
fraction, respectively. Formulas follow lexical scoping rules, which obviates the need
to rename variables — variable bindings are determined the first surrounding :sum
that contains the variable as a subscript.
Additional keys can be added to the Model, Data, Query, and Formula types,
without changing the semantics of a program, permitting considerable future exten-
sibility.
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5.6 ‘Nanopass’ simplification of formulas
The ID algorithm produces formulas that identify causal effects. However,
there is no guarantee that the resulting formulas are particularly understandable or
efficient for estimation. Essentially, the ID algorithm is ‘unaware’ of the rules of
probability theory.
One approach to simplifying formulas is to add steps to the ID algorithm to
simplify formulas during identification. The ID algorithm is recursive; by interleav-
ing simplification and identification steps, it is possible to dramatically reduce the
complexity of the final formula [80].
The disadvantage of this approach is that it requires specific changes to the
implementation of the ID algorithm and intertwines identification and simplification.
This raises difficulties for future extensions. Instead, Whittemore’s approach is to
borrow the idea of a ‘nanopass’ compiler [43]. The ‘core’ inference performed by the
implementation of ID produces unsimplified, but valid formulas. These formulas
can then be sent through a pipeline of simplification steps, repeatedly applying
pattern-matching rules to reduce the complex formulas into simpler, but still valid
formulas. The requirement is that each ‘pass’ produces a simpler, but still valid
formula, preserving correctness, while leaving this process open to customization
and extension.
Whittemore’s implementation is especially amenable to this approach since
Formulas are ‘ordinary’ Clojure data structures and immutable. It is safe to ‘change’
a formula because it is not a true change — it produces a logically new formula data
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structure. The implementation shares structure for efficiency, but this is safe to do
so because the interface does not permit in-place modification. It is also easy to
take advantage of parallelism. There is no risk to sharing the same formula among
separate threads, because there is no state that can be corrupted via race conditions.
As an example, the formula P (x,y,z)∑
y P (x,y,z)
is represented by the following map:
{:numer {:p #{:x :y :z}},
:denom {:sub #{:y},
:sum {:p #{:x :y :z}}}}
This formula can be reduced to {:p #{:y} :given #{:x :z}} by applying
a marginalization rule on the :denom form, resulting in {:numer #{:y :z :x}
:denom :p #{:z :x}}. This, in turn, can be reduced to {:p #{:y} :given #{:x
:z}} by applying a conditional probability rule. This final formula is a representa-
tion of P (y | x, z).
The ‘nanopass’ approach respects separation of concerns in the implementa-
tion: the tasks of identification and simplification are kept entirely separate. An
advantage of this approach is that future extensions to causal programming that im-
plement additional identification algorithms will get any improvements on the com-
pilation pipeline for ‘free’. For example, to add support for for conditional causal ef-
fect queries (e.g. P (y | z, do(x))) and/or counterfactual queries (e.g. P (Yx | x′)), the
implementation of identify could be updated to the IDC or IDC* [74] algorithm.
The output of an updated identify can be sent through the same simplification
pipeline, requiring no additional changes to Whittemore.
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5.7 Estimation and the distribution protocol
Causal diagrams represent completely nonparametric model assumptions. Ac-
cordingly, the result of running an identification algorithm, given only the assump-
tions in a causal diagram, will also be nonparametric. A Formula calculates a causal
effect query as a function of probability functions. For example, in the front-door
model example, P (y | do(x)) is identified by the formula ∑z P (y | x, z)P (z), which
is a function of the conditional probability function P (y | x, z) and the marginal
probability function P (z).
The structure of P (y | x, z) and P (z) depends on the type of probability
distribution being represented. Estimating causal effects, i.e. calculating numerical
probabilities, requires specific knowledge of this representation. This is at odds with
the nonparametric nature of a Formula.
To solve this ‘impedance mismatch’ between identification and estimation,
Whittemore treats the problem of evaluating a formula to be part of the defini-
tion of a probability distribution. There is no single piece of code describing how
a Formula evaluates probabilities, that would limit Whittemore to a single method
of estimation. The design relies on the definition and implementation of a prob-
ability distribution to describe how it applies a Formula to itself. Formula code
remains distribution-agnostic and the implementation of estimation methods and
the representation of probability distributions can be open to user extension.
Conceptually, formulas are treated as transformations from probability distri-
butions to probability distributions, not as a means of calculating the probability of
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an individual event. As a result, there’s no restrictions on how a probability distri-
bution has to be represented in a program. Whittemore merely defines a probability
distribution protocol. In Clojure, a protocol is a named set of methods and their
signatures; the resulting functions are polymorphic in their first argument.7 The
Distribution protocol is defined as the following methods:
• (estimate this formula )
Returns the result of applying a formula to this distribution, yielding a new
distribution.
• (measure this event )
Returns the probability of event, i.e. measure implements the mathemati-
cal concept of a probability measure. An event is expected to be a map of
keywords to values.
• (signature this )
Returns the Data ‘signature’ of the distribution.
Whittemore includes an implementation of a categorical distribution. Con-
structing a categorical distribution is done with the categorical function which
accepts a vector of samples (events) as it’s argument and automatically infers the
support of the joint distribution. As a simple example:
(define example-distribution
(categorical
[{:x 0, :y 0}
{:x 0, :y 1}
7Clojure protocols are analogous to a Java interface.
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{:x 1, :y 0}
{:x 1, :y 1}
{:x 1, :y 1}]))
creates a joint categorical distribution from a collection of five samples. The
resulting probability distribution has P (x = 1, y = 1) = 2/5 and P (x = 0, y =
1) = P (x = 1, y = 0) = P (x = 0, y = 0) = 1/5 and is represented as a map of the
distribution’s probability mass function. For categorical distributions, measure can
be implemented as a simple map lookup, e.g. (measure example-distribution
{:x 0, :y 0}) returns 2/5. The signature of this distribution is {:joint #{:x
:y}}, i.e. a representation that this is a joint distribution over the variablesX and Y .
Neither signature, nor measure is typically called from user code — Whittemore
provides higher-level functions and ‘syntactic sugar’.
The Distribution protocol is user extensible; other probability distributions
can be implemented in the host language without modification to Whittemore’s
implementation. The implementation of estimate for a new distribution only has to
specify how a formula transforms a probability distribution into another probability
distribution — the other use cases are also ‘syntactic sugar’.
5.8 Infer and ‘syntactic sugar’
The reference implementation of Whittemore provides some ‘syntactic sugar’
to make causal programming easier. In particular, the q operator has three versions
that mimic common usage of P () in probability theory:
• ‘Unbound’ query, e.g. (q [:y] :do [:x]), a query where do and given are
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vectors. An unbound query can still be provided as an argument to identify,
but the resulting formula cannot be used as an argument to estimate without
first providing the necessary variable bindings.
• ‘Bound’ query, e.g. (q [:y] :do {:x 0}), corresponding to a conditional
or interventional distribution (this is considered the canonical version of a
Query).
• ‘Event’ query, e.g. (q {:y 1} :do {:x 0}), corresponding to a specific prob-
ability, i.e. effect is an event.
Providing an event query to estimate implies measure. For example, assum-
ing that an appropriate probability distribution is bound to the symbol smoking8:
(estimate smoking
(q {:y 1} :given {:x 1}))
Returns the probability 0.8525.
In addition, Whittemore provides the infer operator, which combines the
functionality of identify, estimate and measure. For example:
(infer front-door smoking
(q {:y 1} :do {:x 1}))
Returns the probability 0.4975.
8These examples assume that smoking follows the probability distribution in [57, Table 3.1]
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Chapter 6: The computational power of dynamic Bayesian networks
Decidable problems are priceless; for everything else, there’s pattern-
matching.
—Meredith Patterson
6.1 Cyclic causal models
The theory of causal programming and the implementation in Whittemore
were designed to respect somewhat competing principles: a researcher should be
able to express a very general class of models, queries and data/distributions, while
still allowing implementations to guarantee completeness in inference. In particular,
the class of models that is supported is precisely that of acyclic causal diagrams,
essentially, the space of ‘fully’ nonparametric structural causal model assumptions.
Nonparametricity in model specification is a ‘liberating’ assumption — it al-
lows a researcher to enter the assumption that X causes Y , while making no ad-
ditional claims as to the nature of that relationship. In contrast, requiring acyclic
causal diagrams is restrictive, removing a potentially interesting class of models from
analysis. This suggests the following related analysis: in what sense the restriction
to acyclic graphs is a ‘natural’ restriction?
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The definition of structural causal models (Definition 2.4.2) requires that each
fi equation forms a mapping from Ui∪PAi to Vi; each equation assigns a value to its
corresponding endogenous variable as a function of its direct causes and the entire
set of equations has a unique solution. The nonparametric nature of the equations
is essentially the source of problem. A system of nonlinear equations may have zero,
one, or multiple solutions — this last case is particularly problematic. In the case
of zero solutions, it is reasonable to claim that the model is simply inconsistent. In
the case of multiple solutions, a probability over the background variables no longer
uniquely induces a probability distribution over the endogenous variables.
It is illuminating to consider what cyclic models are generally designed to an-
alyze: the equilibrium distribution of variables evolving over time. Cases of mutual
causation, e.g. X causing Y and Y causing X can be broken down into cases of
variables affecting their next time-step: Xt causing Yt+1 and Yt causing Xt+1. A
cyclic causal model is ‘shorthand’ for a model unrolled over time.
This chapter argues that extending causal analysis to cyclic causal diagrams
is fundamentally difficult. In particular, it presents a proof that the equilibrium
distribution of dynamic Bayesian networks is uncomputable by showing that such
networks can simulate arbitrary computation.
This has consequences for any attempt to extend causal programming to sup-
port cyclic models: if the equilibrium distribution of such models in uncomputable,
then it is impossible to design complete algorithms for conducting inference. Infor-
mally, the causal programming abstraction ‘breaks’. With nonparametric, acyclic
models, it is possible to implement a programming language that is guaranteed to
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find a formula that computes a given causal query, whenever such a formula exists.
When this process fails, it is because such a formula can not exist — the model
assumptions are provably too weak.
When the causal models, themselves, are capable of performing arbitrary com-
putation, it is impossible to design causal inference algorithms with such a property.
It may be the case that, for given model assumptions, a query has a definitive an-
swer. It will not be possible, in general, to design an algorithm that is guaranteed
to answer a query, because doing so is equivalent to solving the halting problem. In
other words, inference may fail, and it will be unknowable if the failure is because
the query has no answer, or if because the execution of the algorithm was simply
unable to find the answer. It may be the case that inference needs to be run longer,
but it may be the case that it will never succeed.
6.2 Dynamic Bayesian Networks
Dynamic Bayesian networks are the time-generalization of Bayesian networks
and relate variables to each other over adjacent time steps. Dynamic Bayesian
networks unify and extend a number of state-space models including hidden Markov
models, hierarchical hidden Markov models and Kalman filters. Dynamic Bayesian
networks (DBN) extend Bayesian networks to model a probability distribution over a
semi-infinite collection of random variables, with each collection of random variables
modeling the system at a point in time [18]. Following the conventions in [54], the
collections are denoted Z1, Z2, . . . and variables are partitioned Zt = (Ut, Xt, Yt) to
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represent input, hidden and output variables of a state space model. Such a network
is “dynamic” in the sense that it can model a dynamic system, not that the network
topology changes over time.
A DBN is defined as a pair (B1, B→), where B1 is a Bayesian network that
defines the prior P (Z1) and B→ is a two-slice temporal Bayes net (2TBN) that




P (Zit |pa(Zit)) (6.1)
where Zit is the i
th node at time t, and pa(Zit) are the parents of Z
i
t in the graph.
A 2TBN is simply a Bayesian network where the nodes are partitioned into vertices
at time t and time t+ 1. The parents of a node can either be in the same time slice
or in the previous time slice (i.e. the model is first-order Markov).
The semantics of a DBN can be defined by “unrolling in time” the 2TBN until
there are T time-slices; the joint distribution is then given by:





P (ZiT |pa(Zit)) (6.2)
Analyzing the computational power of a DBN requires defining what it means
for a DBN to accept (and halt) or reject an input. Define an input sequence, {Ut} of
Bernoulli random variables to model the binary input. Similarly, define an output
sequence {Yt} (Yt ∈ {run, halt0, halt1}) to represent whether the machine has halted
and the answer that it gives. Given an input, in1, in2, . . . , int, to a decision problem,
the machine modeled by the DBN has halted and accepted at time t, if and only if
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P (Yt = halt1|U1 = in1, . . . , Un = int) > 0.5 and halted and rejected if and only if
P (Yt = halt0|U1 = in1, . . . , Un = int) > 0.5.
6.3 Discrete Dynamic Bayesian Networks Are Not Turing-complete
“Discrete” Bayesian networks are Bayesian networks where all random vari-
ables have some finite number of outcomes, i.e. Bernoulli or categorical random
variables. If dynamic Bayesian networks are permitted to increase the number of
random variables in the network over time, then simulating a Turing-machine be-
comes trivial: simply add a new variable each time step to model a newly reachable
cell on the Turing machine’s tape. However, this requires some ‘first-order’ features
in the language used to specify the network and the computational effort required
at each step of the simulation will grow without bound.
With a fixed number of random variables at each time step and the property
that DBNs are first-order Markov, the computational effort per step remains con-
stant. However, discrete DBNs have sub-Turing computational power. Intuitively,
a discrete DBN cannot possibly simulate a Turing machine since there is no way to
store the contents of the machine’s tape.
More formally, any discrete Bayesian network can be converted into a hidden
Markov model [54]. This is done by ‘collapsing’ the hidden variables (Xt) of the DBN
into a single random variable by taking the Cartesian product of their sample space.
The ‘collapsed’ DBN models a probability distribution over an exponentially larger,
but still finite sample space. Hidden Markov models are equivalent to probabilistic
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finite automata [19] which recognize the stochastic languages. Stochastic languages
are in the RP-complexity class and thus discrete DBNs are not Turing complete.
6.4 A Dynamic Bayesian Network with Continuous and Discrete
Variables
I present a construction for a 2TBN that can simulate the transitions of a
two stack push-down automaton (PDA), which is equivalent to the standard one
tape Turing machine. A two stack PDA consists of a finite control, two unbounded
binary stacks and an input tape. At each step of computation, the machine reads
and advances the input tape, reads the top element of each stack and can either
push a new element, pop the top element or leave each stack unchanged. The state
of the control can change as function of previous state and the read symbols. When
the control reaches one of two possible halt states ({halt0, halt1}), the machine stops
and its output to the decision problem it was computing is defined which of the halt
states it stops on.
A key part of the construction is using a Dirac distribution to simulate a











A single Dirac distributed random variable is sufficient to simulate a stack.









Note that if the string begins with the value 1, then q has a value of at least
3/4 and if the string begins with 0, then q is less than 1/2 - there is never a need
to distinguish among two very close numbers to read the most significant digit. In
addition, the empty string is encoded as q = 0, but any non-empty string has value
at least 1/4.
All random variables, except for the stack random variables, are categorically
distributed - thus, the conditional probabilities densities between them can be rep-
resented using standard conditional probability tables.
Extracting the top value from a stack requires a conditional probability dis-
tribution for a Bernoulli random variable (Top ∈ {0, 1}), given a Dirac (Stack ∈ R)
distributed parent. The Heavyside step function meets this requirement and is







The linear operation 4q− 2 transfers the range of q to at least 1 when the top
element of the stack is 1 and no more than 0 when the top element of the stack is
0. Then, the conditional probability density function:
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P (Top|Stack = q) = H(4q − 2) (6.6)
yields P (Top) = 1 whenever the top element of the stack is 1 and P (Top) = 0
whenever the top element of the stack is 0.
Similarly, a conditional probability distribution can be defined for Bernoulli
random variable Empty ∈ {0, 1}, as:
P (Empty|Stack = q) = 1−H(4q) (6.7)
to check if a stack is empty.




and 4q − (2b + 1) push and pop b,
respectively, from a stack. The conditional probability density for a stack at time
t + 1, given a stack at time t, the top of the stack at time t, and action to be
performed on the stack (Actiont ∈ {push0, push1, pop, noop}) is fully described as
follows:
P (Stackt+1|Topt = p, Stackt = q, Actiont = push0) = δ(q/4 + 1/4)
P (Stackt+1|Topt = p, Stackt = q, Actiont = push1) = δ(q/4 + 3/4)
P (Stackt+1|Topt = p, Stackt = q, Actiont = pop) = δ(4q − (2p+ 1))
P (Stackt+1|Topt = p, Stackt = q, Actiont = noop) = δ(q) (6.8)
Since there are two stacks in the full construction, they are labeled, at time
134
t, as Stacka,t and Stackb,t. The rest of the construction is straightforward. Statet,
Actiona and Actionb are functions of Statet−1, T opa,t, Emptya,t, T opb,t, Emptyb,t and
int. Since all of these are discrete random variables, the conditional probability
densities is simply the transition function of the PDA, written as a (0, 1) stochastic
matrix. As expected P (Y = halti|State) = 1 if State is that halt state, and 0
otherwise.
Finally, the priors for the dynamic Bayesian network are simply P (Stacka,1) =
P (Stackb,1) = δ(0), P (State1 = q0) = 1, where q0 is the initial state.
As described, this construction is somewhat of an abuse of the term ‘proba-
bilistic graphical model’ - all probability mass is concentrated into a single event
for every random variable in the system, for every time step. However, it is easy
to see this construction faithfully simulates a two stack machine, as each random
variable in the construction corresponds exactly to a component of the simulated
automaton.
6.5 Exact Inference in Continuous-discrete Bayesian Networks
This construction requires continuous random variables, which raise concerns
as to whether the marginal posterior probabilities can be effectively computed. The
original junction tree algorithm [46] and cut-set conditioning [59] approaches to
belief propagation compute exact marginals for arbitrary DAGs, but require discrete
random variables. Lauritzen’s algorithm [45] conducts inference in mixed graphical
models, but is limited to conditional linear Gaussian (CLG) continuous random
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variables. In a CLG model, let X be a continuous node, A be its discrete parents,
and Y1, . . . , Yk be continuous parents. Then






Lauritzen’s algorithm can only conduct approximate inference, since the true
posterior marginals may be some multimodal mix of Gaussians, while the algorithm
itself only supports CLG random variables. However, the algorithm is exact in the
sense that it computes exact first and second moments for the posterior marginals
which is sufficient for the Turing machine simulation.
Laurientz’s algorithm does not permit discrete random variables to be chil-
dren of continuous random variables. Lerner’s algorithm [47] extends Lauritzen’s
algorithm to support softmax conditional probability densities for discrete children
of continuous parents. Let A be a discrete node with the possible values a1, . . . , am
and let Y1, . . . , Yk be its parents. Then:













Like Lauritzen’s algorithm, Lerner’s algorithm computes approximate poste-
rior marginals - relying on the observation that the product of a softmax and a
Gaussian is approximately Gaussian - but exact first and second moments, up to er-
rors in the numerical integration used to compute the best Gaussian approximation
of the product of a Gaussian and a softmax. This calculation is actually simpler in
the case where the softmax is replaced with a Heavyside and the Lerner algorithm
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can run essentially unmodified with a mixture of Heavyside and softmax conditional
probability densities. In the case of Dirac-distributed parents, with Heavyside con-
ditional probability densities, numeric integration is unnecessary and no errors are
introduced in computing the first and second moments of the posterior distribution.
Any non-zero variance for the continuous variables will ‘leak’ probability to
other values for the ‘stack’ random variables in the Turing machine simulation, even-
tually leading to errors. Lauritzen’s original algorithm assumes positive-definite co-
variance matrices for the continuous random variables, but can be extend to handle
degenerate Gaussians [67]. In summary: posterior marginals for the Turing ma-
chine simulation can be computed exactly, using a modified version of the Lerner
algorithm when restricted to Dirac distributed continuous random variables with
Heavside conditional probability densities. If Gaussian random variables and soft-
max conditional probability densities are also introduced, then the first and second
moments of the posterior marginals can be computed ‘exactly’, up to errors in
numerical integration, although this will slowly degrade the quality of the Turing
machine simulation in later time steps.
Inference in Bayesian networks is NP-hard [13]. However, assuming that arith-
metic operations can be computed in unit time over arbitrary-precision numbers (e.g.
the real RAM model), the work necessary at each time step is constant. Thus, dy-
namic Bayesian networks can simulate Turing-machines with only a constant time
overhead in the real RAM model, and slowdown proportional to the time complexity
of arbitrary precision arithmetic otherwise.
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6.6 Aside: comparison to neural networks
This result for dynamic Bayesian networks is analogous to Siegelmann and
Sontag’s proof that a recurrent neural network can simulate a Turing machine in
real time [77]. In fact, neural networks and Bayesian networks turn out to have very
similar expressive power:
1. Single perceptron ≈ Gaussian naive Bayes (Logistic regression) [55]
2. Multilayer perceptron ≈ Full Bayesian network (Universal function approxi-
mation) [14] [85]
3. Recurrent neural network ≈ Dynamic Bayesian network (Turing complete)
There is an interesting gap in decidability - it takes very little to turn a sub-
Turing framework for modeling into a Turing-complete one. In the case of neural
networks, a single recurrent layer, with arbitrary-precision rational weights and a
saturating linear transfer function is sufficient. With dynamic Bayesian networks,
two time-slices, continuous-valued random variables with a combination of linear
and step function conditional probability densities is sufficient.
Although such a simple recurrent neural network is theoretically capable of
performing arbitrary computations, practical extensions include higher-order con-
nections [64], ‘gates’ in long short-term memory [36], and even connections to an
‘external’ Turing machine [28]. These additions enrich the capabilities of standard
neural networks and make it easier to train them for complex algorithmic tasks.
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An interesting open question is to what degree dynamic Bayesian networks can
be similarly extended and how the ‘core’ dynamic Bayesian network being capable
of Turing-complete computation affects the overall performance of such networks.
6.7 Consequences for causal modeling
The main consequence of the uncomputability of dynamic Bayesian networks
for causal modeling can be summed up as “Nonparametric, cyclic, complete: pick
at most two”. The vast majority of this dissertation focused on nonparametric
models with completeness guarantees in inference. In comparison, linear structural
equation modeling is decidedly parametric, but guarantees a unique equilibrium,
even in cyclic models.
Unfortunately, the main result in this chapter suggests that preserving com-
pleteness for other classes of parametric models is fundamentally difficult: simu-
lating a Turing machine can be done with a combination of discrete and normally
distributed random variables, even if the only permitted conditional density func-
tion between continuous parents and discrete children is the logistic function. This
strongly suggests that semi-parametric classes of cyclic models will often be simi-
larly lacking in completeness guarantees, e.g. restricting the fis to monotonic func-
tions will be insufficient. Informally, it is too easy to render a system ‘accidentally’
Turing-complete.
This is not to suggest that cyclic causal modeling and inference is hopeless in
practice — many particular sets of model assumptions permit computing the equi-
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librium distribution of the system. What is unobtainable is the guarantee that the
query will either be identifiable or provably unidentifiable from the information at
hand. In a sense, this is no worse than most mathematical and scientific research —
the solution may be provable with more work, or forever unprovable. Nonparamet-
ric, acyclic models are profoundly unusual in the strong inference guarantees that
can be provided.
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and future work
The really challenging problems are still ahead.
—Judea Pearl
7.1 Summary
The underlying goal of this dissertation was to reduce the ambiguity and dif-
ficulty of rigorous causal modeling and inference. To this end, this dissertation
explored the development of new abstractions, taxonomies and related analyses
based on structural causal models. The causation coefficient, taxonomy of correla-
tion/causation relationships and related analysis clarify how correlation and causa-
tion can fail to coincide and provide an argument for the necessity of formal causal
analysis. The causal programming abstractions of model, distribution, query and
formula unify a large number of different causal inference problems into a single the-
oretical framework. The implementation of causal programming demonstrates that
it is possible to provide a declarative programming language and interactive system
for the identification and estimation of interventional queries. Finally, the analysis of
the equilibrium distribution of cyclic models suggests that recursive, nonparametric
models are, in some sense, maximally powerful.
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The ‘core’ of the work described in this dissertation is the design and imple-
mentation of causal programming. The analysis of the causation coefficient supports
the necessity of causal programming, and the analysis of cyclic models suggests that
further generalization is fundamentally difficult. Causal programming itself shows
that it is possible to abstract over problems of causality — making it easy to declare
and understand causal assumptions, while automating away the task of conducting
inference.
Ideally, a researcher should only need to formally declare what they know and
what they wish to know, and be guaranteed to either get the correct answer, or
rest assured that that reaching such a conclusion is impossible with the available
information. The implementation of causal programming is a first, concrete step
towards this goal.
7.2 Contributions
The specific contributions of the dissertation are as follows:
• The causation coefficient and related analyses introduce a taxonomy of correla-
tion / causation relationships and a new method for visualizing distributions
of causal models. I argue it is insufficient to merely say ‘correlation is not
causation’; no single epigram will suffice to convey the nature of the possible
interactions. The taxonomy outlines how correlation and causation may fail to
coincide. Introducing the γρ plot makes it possible to visualize where in this
taxonomy a distribution of models lie. This provides new possible intuition for
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understanding why, despite warnings, it is easy to fall into the trap of think-
ing correlation and causation are the same. For random models, drawn from
a distribution of simple causal models, correlation and causation mostly do
coincide. However, for models where this is not true, no amount of additional
data sampling will suffice to correct the misconception. There is simply no
substitute for proper causal analysis.
• The causal programming abstractions group the mathematical objects asso-
ciated with structural causal modeling into: model, data, query and formula.
This permits unifying a large number of (previously separate) problems in
causal inference and acts as a guide for formalizing new problems of interest.
• The implementation of causal programming demonstrates that the abstrac-
tions are amenable to automated inference. The chief significance is that this
demonstrates that it is possible to implement the identification and estima-
tion of interventional queries as a declarative (purely functional) programming
language. As an embedded, domain specific language, it is straightforward to
extend the language and embed it into a notebook interface for interactive
computing. Lisp syntax permits the syntax of the language to closely match
the underlying mathematics. Since the implementation is based on a new,
purely functional implementation of Shpitser’s ID algorithm, inference is com-
plete for identifying causal effect queries from joint observational probability
distributions.
• The analysis of the equilibrium distribution of cyclic models is centered around
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a proof that the equilibrium distribution of dynamic Bayesian networks is
noncomputable, given mild assumptions about the distribution of the random
variables in the model. This strongly suggests a fundamental limitation to
causal modeling and inference. Methods to analyze cyclic, nonparametric
models will be necessarily incomplete.
7.3 Future work
The current implementation of causal programming is limited in the types of
inference that can be performed. It should be relatively straightforward to imple-
ment support for counterfactual queries, surrogate experiments and transportabil-
ity problems — there exists efficient complete algorithms for these problems in the
structural causal model literature. In addition, sound, but incomplete support for
recovery from selection bias, causal discovery, research design and query generation
could be added.
The implementation of causal programming does not directly try to solve the
problem of estimation, effectively ‘offloading’ it to a protocol, to be implemented
by user code. This opens up the possibility to combine causal programming with
probabilistic programming. Causal programming generates formulas that trans-
form probability distribution to other probability distribution, but exact inference
is expensive in the general case. One of probabilistic programming’s key insights is
that intractable exact inference problems can be solved approximately by sampling.
Instead of computing the distribution directly, a large number of samples can be
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generated, from which measures of interest (e.g. expected value) can be efficiently
calculated. Probabilistic programming is an active area of research, and by combing
causal programming with probabilistic programming, advances in one will benefit
the other.
A more ambitious goal of automating scientific discovery likely remains far off.
Hopefully, causal programming represents one step towards that goal: as a guide
to designing languages and software systems that make it easy for researchers to
formalize and understand what their assumptions and data and enabling a virtuous
cycle between computer inference and human judgement.
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